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The Categorical Distinction between Adolescents and 
Adults: The Supreme Court’s Juvenile Punishment 
Cases—Constitutional Implications for Regulating 
Teenage Sexual Activity 
Martin R. Gardner* 
I. Introduction 
It is well established that the United States Supreme Court has 
never developed a systematic theory of young people’s rights.1 Indeed, 
a leading commentator recently questioned whether the Court “is ca-
pable of developing a coherent, consistent policy with respect to chil-
dren’s rights.”2 
Such a task is complicated by the fact that three sets of interests—
the child’s, her parents’, and the state’s—routinely coalesce and require 
accommodation. Moreover, explicating the theoretical grounds for the 
rights of juveniles is further made difficult because the Court has seem-
ingly given support to two conflicting theories of rights in its case law.3 
In the more predominant of the two, the Court has often taken the 
 
* Steinhart Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, College of Law. The author expresses his 
gratitude to Megan Bischoff for her excellent research assistance. This article is an expansion of 
a paper presented at the Symposium on Contemporary Issues Regarding Marriage and Children, 
held at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, on March 15, 2013. 
 1.  See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process 
Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L. Q. 153, 154 (1978); Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A 
Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 258 (1979). In some contexts at least, the 
Court has itself eschewed “absolute rules” defining juvenile and parental rights respectively in 
favor of case-by-case flexibility. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 420 (1981) (declining 
to fashion an absolute rule regarding parental notice of pregnant minors’ decision to have an 
abortion). 
 2.  SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 6 (2011). 
 3.  See infra text and notes at 77–151. 
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position that young people are entitled to paternalistic care and pro-
tection and not to the array of autonomy rights available to adults.4 At 
the same time, some cases appear to grant adult rights of constitutional 
personhood5 in some contexts.6 
These two inconsistent concepts of rights7 are founded on com-
peting underlying empirical assumptions about the nature of child-
hood. The protectionist tradition assumes that children, even adoles-
cents, are uniquely vulnerable, dependent, and less competent decision 
makers than adults.8 Personhood theorists, on the other hand, rely on 
social science data9 supporting the view that adults and adolescents are 





 4.  See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 511–17 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, Constitutional Status]. 
 5.  My reference to “personhood rights” is described by some as “autonomy rights,” see 
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 426, and by others as “choice rights.” See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s 
Liberation and the New Equalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 644 [hereinafter Hafen, Children’s Liberation]. 
 6.  See text and notes at 107–151. 
 7.  The Court’s embrace of these inconsistent rights is vividly evidenced by consideration 
of two cases delivered the same day. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979), a case denying 
procedural protections to minors admitted to state mental hospitals at the behest of their parents 
or guardians, the Court expressed a clearly protectionist view: “Most children even in adoles-
cence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions . . . . Parents can 
and must make those judgments.” Yet, in the other case, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707(1979), 
the Court appeared to give its blessing to personhood theory in holding that minors are not 
entitled to any special protections, such as access to parents or legal counsel, as preconditions to 
valid waivers of Miranda rights granted to subjects of police interrogation. The Court stated: 
[The] totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there 
has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved. We discern no 
persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether 
a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. 
Id. at 725. 
 8.  Wald, supra note 1, at 259. 
 9.  The Supreme Court has not as yet recognized this research. 
 10.  See infra text and notes at 55–61. 
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While sometimes attending to empirical studies,11 the Court has 
most often simply reached its conclusions, either in protectionist or 
personhood terms, without direct appeal to available studies indicating 
underlying differences or similarities between young people and 
adults.12 Recently, however, in a series of cases disallowing certain 
harsh punishments as cruel and unusual when applied to juveniles tried 
within the criminal justice system, the Court expressly appealed to re-
search identifying differences between average teenagers and adults.13 
Based on these studies, the Court concluded that adolescents up to the 
age of eighteen are categorically distinct from adults in terms of their 
ability to make mature choices, to think and act as independent agents, 
and in terms of their unique transitory personality traits. These dis-
tinctions led the Court to conclude that young people lack adult cul-
pability. 
The Court’s distinction between adults and adolescents is obvi-
ously significant as an Eighth Amendment matter. But recognition of 
the distinction could have a broader impact. The punishment cases 
mark the Court’s clearest expression yet given of the fact that adoles-
cents are a constitutionally distinct class from adults. Moreover, it sup-
ports this conclusion by its most direct and extensive appeal to social 
science evidence in all of its juvenile law cases. Indeed, the Court may 
have finally answered Bruce Hafen’s concern that the “sensible . . . as-
sertion that adolescents through age eighteen generally lack some fun-
 
 11.  See, for example, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 
(2009), where the Court referred to social science research documenting the negative psycholog-
ical effects of strip searches on young people as support for finding that a strip search of a public 
school student violated the Fourth Amendment. 
 12.  See, for example, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979), where the Court stated 
the following without support of empirical evidence: “[D]uring the formative years of childhood 
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and 
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” For criticism of the Belloti Court’s failure to 
attend to scientific studies contrary to the Court’s conclusions, see Rhonda Gay Hartman, Ado-
lescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1265, 1348 (2000). For a 
criticism of the Court’s reliance on “the pages of human experience” rather than on current social 
science in its Parham decision, supra note 7, see Gary B. Melton, Children’s Competence to Consent 
in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, 1, 9–11 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983). 
 13.  See infra text and notes 160–206. 
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damental forms of capacity” is a proposition in need of empirical sup-
port.14 
The Court’s finding is clearly protectionist in nature—adolescents 
must be protected from harsh punishments imposed on their more 
criminally responsible adult counterparts. This scientifically grounded 
support of protectionism suggests a possible theoretical basis for a sys-
tematic and coherent theory of juvenile rights.15 
Without fully considering that question, I undertake in this article 
the more modest task of exploring the impact of the punishment cases 
in resolving one particular controversial family law issue involving the 
possible existence of a juvenile’s constitutional right to engage in sex-
ual conduct prohibited by the state and against the wishes of that juve-
nile’s parents. While the Supreme Court has seldom decided cases in-
volving direct claims by children of constitutional rights disfavored by 
their parents,16 assertions by minors of constitutionally protected sex-
ual liberty have become more prevalent of late in light of the Supreme 
Court’s recognition in Lawrence v. Texas of a constitutionally protected 
right, at least for adults, to privately engage in consensual sexual inti-
macy.17 
I will examine Lawrence’s possible applicability to minors, taking 
into account the Supreme Court’s punishment cases, in an assessment 
of the constitutionality of fornication statutes applied to juveniles. I 
will show that prior to the Court’s pronouncement of its categorical 
adolescent/adult distinction in the punishment cases, the post-Law-
rence constitutionality of regulating teenage sexual behavior under for-
nication statutes was uncertain. With the guidance of the punishment 
cases, however, such statutes are clearly constitutional. 
 
 14.  Bruce C. Hafen, The Learning Years: A Review of The Changing Legal World of Adoles-
cence, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1983) [hereinafter Hafen, The Learning Years]. Dean Hafen 
raises the concern as a reaction to Franklin Zimring’s proposal, unsupported by empirical data, 
recommending defining the age of majority at age eighteen in certain circumstances. 
 15.  Dean Samuel Davis, along with others, notes “the law’s need of a consistent, coherent 
position regarding the circumstances under which children ought to be regarded as adults.” 
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 28. 
 16.  See infra text and notes 97–102 for an example of such a case. 
 17.  See infra text and notes 240, 245–48. 
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I begin with a brief sketch of the personhood and protectionist the-
ories with attention to underlying social science support. I then discuss 
the law’s traditional treatment of young people, noting the role played 
by chronological age rules, followed by a brief review of the Supreme 
Court’s case law defining the constitutional rights of children and their 
parents respectively. This review reveals the Court’s general espousal 
of protectionism, with rare apparent acknowledgements of juveniles as 
full-fledged constitutional persons. A discussion of the punishment 
cases then describes the Court’s affirmation of a now scientifically 
grounded concept of protectionism. I conclude by relating the punish-
ment cases to post-Lawrence arguments regarding the constitutionality 
of state prohibitions of fornication by minors, concluding that such 
prohibitions reasonably promote legitimate state and parental interests 
and are therefore constitutional. 
II. Protectionism and Personhood: Two Theories of 
Rights 
While most forms of life embody a process where infants over time 
become adult members of the species, human infants are unique, at 
least among primates, in their lengthy period of vulnerability and de-
pendence.18 Thus, childhood for humans constitutes a comparatively 
long time frame during which young people gradually acquire the 
competencies of adulthood.19 
Everyone agrees that very young children must be treated pater-
nalistically by the law.20 While the age of majority21 is generally set at 
age eighteen,22 some argue that young people as early as age fourteen, 
 
 18.  See David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurispruden-
tial Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1980). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  For John Stewart Mill, the perception that children are especially vulnerable and de-
pendent requires the law to protect them “against their own actions as well as against external 
injury.” JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13–14 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 
1956) (1859). 
 21.  See the discussion of chronological age rules infra at text and notes 73, 176, 192, 280. 
 22.  The eighteen-year-old standard is so ubiquitous as the age of majority that Dean Da-
vis stipulates that throughout his recent book “anyone under [eighteen] years of age is considered 
a child and anyone [eighteen] years of age or older is considered an adult.” DAVIS, supra note 2, 
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often viewed as the beginning of “adolescence,”23 should enjoy full 
rights of adulthood.24 Therefore, advocates of personhood rights gen-
erally limit their applicability to adolescents.25 Protectionists, on the 
other hand, usually agree that setting the age of majority at eighteen is 
a defensible basis for distinguishing those entitled to full legal rights 
and responsibilities from those too immature to enjoy full legal per-
sonhood. 
A. Protectionism 
1. The protectionist concept 
Protectionist theory is premised on the idea that children, even ad-
olescents, are different from adults in ways sufficiently significant to 
justify denial of rights of autonomy and personhood. The differences 
entail, among other things, immature mental competence, and unique 
vulnerability and dependence.26 Given these differences, juveniles are 
entitled to protection, including rights to receive care, affection, disci-
pline, and guidance, thus enabling their development into mature, re-
sponsible adults.27 Also included are rights to be supported, main-
tained, educated, and provided legal remedies consistent with a 
minor’s best interests when obligated caretakers fail to provide the ju-
venile the protection to which he or she is entitled.28 
 
at 4. 
 23.  Hartman, supra note 12, at 1266–67 (designating “adolescence” as ages approximately 
14 through 17 years). 
 24.  See infra text and notes 44–52. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 10–11 (3d. ed. 2009). 
 27.  See H. Foster & D. Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972). 
While Foster and Freed develop their “bill of rights” from the premise that children are “per-
sons,” the rights they identify in the text are more at home with protectionist, rather than per-
sonhood, philosophy. 
 28.  The court in People v. Scott D., 315 N.E. 2d 466, 469 (N.Y. 1974) offered this summary 
of protection rights philosophy: “Children may not be equated with adults for all . . . purposes . . . . 
Their natural limitations, varying with age, and the obligation of those, in whose charge they are, 
to protect, guide, and if need be, discipline them, are recognized in every kind of society.” 
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Defenders of protectionism argue that the denial of full person-
hood rights is actually essential to a young person’s maturation into 
responsible adulthood. Bruce Hafen puts the matter this way, using the 
term “choice rights” rather than “personhood rights” as described in 
this paper: 
The development of the capacity to function as a mature, independ-
ent member of society is essential to the meaningful exercise of the 
full range of choice rights characteristic of the individual tradition. 
Precisely because of their lack of capacity, minors should enjoy le-
gally protected rights to special treatment (including some protection 
against their own immaturity) that will optimize their opportunities 
for the development of mature capabilities that are in their best in-
terest. Children will outgrow their restricted state, but the more im-
portant question is whether they will outgrow it with maximized ca-
pacities. An assumption that rational and moral capacity exists, when 
in fact it does not exist, may lead to an abandonment of the protec-
tions, processes, and opportunities that can develop these very capac-
ities. In this sense, the concept of restricting certain choice rights is 
in fact an important form of protection rights. For these reasons, 
some distinction between rights of protection and rights of choice 
must be preserved.29 
Professor Joseph Goldstein notes the value of parental guidance as 
a function within the protectionist tradition: 
The right to family privacy and parental autonomy, as well as the 
reciprocal liberty interest of parent and child in the familial bond be-
tween them, need no greater justification than that they comport 
with each state’s fundamental constitutional commitment to individ-
ual freedom and human dignity. But the right of parents to raise their 
children as they think best, free of coercive intervention, comports as 
well with each child’s biological and psychological need for unthreat-
ened and unbroken continuity of care by his parents. . . . There is  
little doubt that . . . breaches in the familial bond will be detrimental 
to a child’s well-being.30 
 
 29.  Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5, at 650. Franklin Zimring makes a similar 
point. “[Eighteen]-year-olds are in the process of becoming adult . . . . To impose full responsibil-
ity . . . is much like expecting every new bride to be an instant Betty Crocker. It isn’t realistic and 
it isn’t fair.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 20 (2005). 
 30.  Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental 
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Professor Michael Wald adds that “[c]linicians . . . claim that ado-
lescents benefit from having parental restraints available.”31 He ex-
plains: 
Such restraints allow adolescents to challenge authority and to ex-
plore new areas with the realization that “wise” parents will stop 
them if they act in harmful ways. While parents often do not act 
wisely, removing the authority structure may be more detrimental 
than unwise parental actions . . .  
Even if adolescents could make some (or all) decisions without harm-
ing themselves significantly, we still might not give autonomy to chil-
dren because of its disruption of the family system.32  
2. Empirical underpinnings 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court until very recently em-
braced protectionism without any appeal to social science data.33 The 
idea that juveniles lack adult competency and maturity was apparently 
so widely accepted that empirical support was deemed unnecessary. 
However, in the latter half of the 20th century protectionism was 
called into question with the emergence of the children’s liberation 
movement,34 propelled by research suggesting that adolescents cannot 
 
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649 (1977). Professor John Coons expresses a similar view: 
One may liberate children from the law of man, but the law of nature is beyond repeal. 
There is no way to send an eight-year-old out of the sovereignty of the family and into 
a world of liberty. For he will there be introduced to a new sovereignty of one kind or 
another. It may be a regime of want, ignorance, and general oppression; it may be one 
of delightful gratification. The ringmaster could be Fagin or Mary Poppins. Whatever 
the reality, it will be created by people with more power, and by the elements. Chil-
dren—at [least] small children—will not be liberated; they will be dominated . . . . 
This is also true even of mature teenagers who might have a ripened capacity for au-
tonomy or at least for autonomy in regard to specific activities such as driving . . . . 
John E. Coons, Intellectual Liberty and the Schools, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 495, 
503 (1985). 
 31.  Wald, supra note 1, at 275. 
 32.  Id. See also Robert J. Levy, The Rights of Parents, 1976 BYU L. REV. 693, for an argu-
ment that granting greater rights to adolescents risks upsetting traditional values of family pri-
vacy. 
 33.  See supra note 12. 
 34.  The movement is extensively described in Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5. 
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be distinguished from adults in terms of decision-making compe-
tence,35 prompting calls for granting full personhood rights for adoles-
cents.36  
Such calls are controversial, however, in light of recent studies sup-
porting the opposite view that, in general, adolescents differ from av-
erage adults in legally significant ways. This evidence, relied upon by 
the Supreme Court in the punishment cases,37 can be summarized as 
follows: 
Scientific evidence indicates that teens make less competent deci-
sions compared with adults because they are developmentally imma-
ture.38 Adolescents lack the capacity for “autonomous choice, self-
management, risk perception and calculation of future consequences” 
when compared to adults; these traits lead to risky behavior.39 Adoles-
cence is also a developmental period in which personal identity and 
character fluctuate “through a process of exploration and experimen-
tation.”40 
Moreover, adolescents tend to respond to peer influence more 
than adults.41 Indeed, adolescents succumb to peer influence both “di-
rectly,” when subjected to peer-pressure to conform behavior, and “in-
directly,” when seeking peer approval in decision making.42 
 
 35.  See infra text and notes 53-61. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See infra notes 162-206 and accompanying text. 
  38.  Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Texas L. Rev. 799, 801 
(2003). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. The social science literature on the subject of adolescence is considerable. This 
Article addresses only a small sample of the data. 
 41. Elizabeth S. Scott, et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 
19 Law & Hum. Behav. 221, 230 (1995). See also Christopher Slobogin, et al; A Prevention 
Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wisc. L. Rev. 
185, 196–200 (summarizing evidence supporting the view that adolescents are excessive risk-tak-
ers, focus more on short-term consequences of actions and less on long-term impacts than do 
adults, and are more susceptible than adults to peer influence). This research suggests that “the 
average adolescent . . . differs from the average adult in ways that diminish willingness to pay 
attention to the criminal law.” Id. at 196. 
 42.  See Scott et al., supra note 41, at 230. See infra, note 231, referencing the direct/indi-
rect peer pressure distinction. 
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Because they tend to feel invulnerable,43 adolescents also engage in 
riskier behavior than adults in activities such as “criminal conduct, un-
protected sex, and speeding.”44 That the Supreme Court has blest such 
evidence of youthful immaturity in the punishment cases constitutes a 
significant affirmation of the protectionist tradition.45  
B. The Personhood Rights 
1. The personhood conception 
Advocates of personhood rights routinely focus on data suggesting 
that the average adolescent’s cognitive development and moral reason-
ing skills correspond with the average adult’s. Therefore, because ad-
olescents utilize adult reasoning capabilities, they should, on this view, 
enjoy adult rights enforceable against their parents as well as the state. 
Professor Robert Batey argues: 
 From the assumption that adolescents lack the capacity to make 
moral choices affecting their own lives, Anglo-American jurispru-
dence has drawn the conclusion that the adolescent’s parents have 
the right to make those choices. The conclusion that parents have the 
right to make the adolescent’s moral choices must be rejected, how-
ever, because, as studies indicate, the law’s underlying assumption 
that adolescents lack the capacity to make moral choices is incorrect. 
Because a large majority of adolescents do have the moral reasoning 
capacities of adults, the law should accord the considered choices of 
competent adolescents the same treatment it accords similar choices 
of adults . . .  
 If parents can force decisions on adolescents, the courts should 
provide some mechanism to enable competent adolescents to over-
turn those decisions. Similarly, if parents can veto decisions made by 
their adolescent children, those children should be able to obtain ju-
dicial assistance in overriding such vetoes, unless the parents can 
demonstrate that the child did not make a mature choice. . . . Recog-
nition of the adolescent’s capacity for adult moral reasoning . . . re-
quires . . . the court [to] enjoin the parents from interfering unless 
 
 43.  See Scott et al., supra note 41, at 230; Slobogin, supra note 41, at 198. 
 44.  See Scott et al., supra note 41, at 230. 
 45.  See infra notes 162–206 and accompanying text. 
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the parents can establish that the adolescent has made an immature 
judgment.46 
Batey is not alone in espousing the proposition that “the law should 
accord the considered choices of competent adolescents the same 
treatment it accords similar choices of adults.”47 In Wisconsin v. 
Yoder48—a case holding that the religious practice rights of Amish par-
ents entitled them to withdraw their children from public schools in 
violation of state compulsory education laws in order for the children 
to live full time in the Amish religious community—Justice William 
Douglas observed in his dissenting opinion that “children . . . have 
constitutionally protected interests.”49 Relying on “substantial agree-
ment among child psychologists and sociologists that the moral and 
intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult,”50 
Justice Douglas concluded: 
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the in-
evitable effect is to impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon 
their children. Where the child is mature enough to express poten-
tially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child’s rights 
to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views. . . . [I]f an 
Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to 
have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the 
parents’ religiously motivated objections.51 
Douglas went on to claim that children should be “masters of their 
own destiny,” at least so far as educational choices are concerned.52 
Similarly, other personhood theorists have argued for such things as a 
“right to emancipation from the parent-child relationship when that 
relationship has broken down and the child has left home due to . . . 
 
 46.  Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 370, 378 (1982). 
Some personhood advocates go even further than Batey. Richard Farson, for example, argues that 
children should receive full civil rights at birth. Farson’s views are noted in FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING WORLD OF LEGAL ADOLESCENCE 23 (2005). 
 47.  Batey, supra note 46, at 373. 
 48.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 49.  Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
 50.  Id. at 245, n.3. 
 51.  Id. at 242. 
 52.  Id. at 245. 
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serious family conflict,”53 as well as a right for adolescents to be sex-
ually active as a matter of “personal autonomy in making strategic life 
decisions.”54 
2. Empirical underpinnings 
As noted above, personhood advocates rely on studies suggesting 
that nothing distinguishes adolescent decision making competency 
from adults. A commentator summarized the existing social science lit-
erature as follows: 
[The] studies . . . suggest that adolescents, aged 14 and older, possess 
the cognitive capability to reason, understand, appreciate, and artic-
ulate decisions comparable to young adults. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, there is a paucity of scientific or social science study that sup-
ports the present legal view of adolescent incapacity. Despite the 
statistical and scientific evidence, which merits serious consideration 
by policy makers, the principle of decisional incapacity is the raison 
[d’être] for law and the lack of a coherent legal approach for accom-
modating adolescent issues. A backward glance over the twentieth 
century reveals a promising legacy for the recognition of adolescent 
autonomous rights. Realizing more meaningful exercise of those 
rights should be a legacy for the twenty-first century.55 
The studies suggest that when presented with difficult problems of 
moral reasoning, adolescents perform better than younger children 
and roughly on a par with adults.56  
 For some, these findings mean that the law’s conclusions that ad-
olescents generally differ from adults in the exercise of moral reason-
ing skills57 are “simply . . . wrong.”58 One social scientist has argued the 
following concerning the legal consequences that should result from 
 
 53.  Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 
347 (1972). 
 54.  Richards, supra note 18, at 54–55. For an argument espousing a presumption of ado-
lescent “decisional ability” rather than inability, see generally Hartman, supra note 12. 
 55.  Hartman, supra note 12, at 1286. 
 56.  See, e.g., Batey, supra note 46, at 364–70. 
 57.  For a clear statement of the traditional view that adolescents differ from adults in 
reasoning skills, see the quote from the Parham case, supra note 7. 
 58.  Batey, supra note 46, at 369. 
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these studies: 
I am arguing that adolescents’ personhood should be recognized by 
policymakers. Insofar as denial of autonomy has been based on as-
sumptions of incompetence, current psychological research does not 
support such an age-graded distinction. Moreover, . . . recognition of 
personhood might facilitate adolescents’ personal individuation. . . . 
[T]here seems to be ample basis for reversal of current presumptions 
in favor of a view of adolescents as autonomous persons possessed of 
independent interests regarding liberty and privacy.59 
Personhood advocates sometimes cite empirical evidence ques-
tioning the scientific support for other commonly assumed differences 
between adolescents and adults. For example, some claim that the 
“prevailing myth” of excessive adolescent risk taking has been “de-
bunked by researchers” who have supposedly established that risk-tak-
ing activities of adolescents do not exceed those of adults.60 Along the 
same lines, some urge that feelings of invulnerability, a precursor to 
risk-taking actions, are “no more pronounced among adolescents than 
among adults.”61 
C. Protectionist and Personhood Rights? 
Recently, commentators have begun to argue that adolescents pos-
sess protectionist rights in some contexts and personhood rights in 
others. From the studies showing that, by the early teen years, adoles-
cents’ general cognitive abilities are essentially indistinguishable from 
those of adults, some maintain that in situations requiring “logical rea-
soning about moral, social, and interpersonal matters,” adolescents 
should therefore be treated as legal adults.62 Supposedly, such a view 
does not dispute the validity of the studies demonstrating the develop-
 
 59.  Gary B. Melton, Toward “Personhood” for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in 
Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 102 (1983). 
 60.  Hartman, supra note 12, at 1348–49, n. 346. But see supra text at notes 38–40. 
 61.  Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on 
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995). 
 62.  Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to 
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 
586 (2009). 
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mental immaturity of adolescents regarding propensities for risk-tak-
ing and extraordinary peer influence. Hence, in situations where rash 
decisions are made, adolescents often act immaturely and thus should 
not be considered adults for legal purposes.63 Consequently, in spur of 
the moment situations like those involved in most juvenile crime, ad-
olescents lack adult culpability necessitating protection from harsh 
punishments imposed on adults.64 On the other hand, in situations 
where deliberate decision making is involved, in deliberations about 
healthcare for example, adolescents arguably function as autonomous 
persons.65 
D. Summary 
The above discussion demonstrates that attention to social science 
studies on the nature of adolescence may lead to two different concep-
tions of rights. First, protectionism finds support from studies showing 
adolescents uniquely prone to risk-taking behavior, to be more suscep-
tible to peer-pressure, and less able to assess the future consequences 
of their actions than adults. Second, personhood advocates justify their 
position by appeal to studies showing adolescent/adult equivalence in 
competently making decisions in contexts of unhurried deliberation. 
III. Constitutional Rights of Adolescents and Their 
Parents 
Throughout the history of Anglo-American law, young people 
have been treated as a distinct class for legal purposes.66 At common 
law, an “infant” was any person under the age of twenty-one.67 Chron-
ological age rules defined the status of minority without regard to in-
dividualized characteristics such as physical maturity, mental capacity, 
education, experience, or accomplishment.68 Such rules continue to be 
the primary vehicle for determining adult legal status, although the age 
 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 593. 
 65.  Id. at 592. 
 66.  GARDNER, supra note 26, at 3–4. 
 67.  See e.g., Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392, 396 (Me. 1976). 
 68.  See, e.g., Hartwell v. Cooper, 380 P.2d 591, 592 (Alaska 1963). 
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of majority is not defined by a single age for all purposes.69 With the 
passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment allowing eighteen-year-olds 
the right to vote,70 most states have statutorily reduced the general age 
of majority to age eighteen.71 
Defining legal adulthood in terms of chronological age standards 
is controversial for some. Everyone agrees that arriving at adulthood 
is a process and not the function of reaching a particular birthday. Not 
all young people become mature and responsible adults at the same 
age. Moreover, the emergence of the social science data on adolescent 
decision making discussed above72 has led to a call in some quarters to 
abandon chronological rules in favor of individualized assessments of 
competency as the means for determining adult legal status.73 Never-
theless, while current law does employ a few manifestations of the in-
dividualized approach,74 legal adulthood continues to be determined 
almost exclusively by chronological age rules.75 Thus, it is most often 
in the context of such rules that the Supreme Court has addressed con-
stitutional claims of young people, which occasionally conflict with the 
desires of their parents. 
In determining the constitutional rights of children and parents 
respectively, it is helpful to be sensitive to how the three parties—state, 
parent, and child—align. For instance, when the interests of the parent 
and the child are united against the state whose action is found uncon-
stitutional, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether the right denied is 
 
 69.  For example, states generally permit young people to operate motor vehicles at an 
earlier age than the general age of majority while not allowing them to consume alcohol until age 
twenty-one. See GARDNER, supra note 26, at 4. 
 70.  “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to 
vote shall not be denied. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 71.  GARDNER, supra note 26, at 4. 
 72.  See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 73.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 74.  Individualized assessments of competency are routinely made by juvenile court judges 
in making decisions whether to transfer jurisdiction from juvenile to criminal court. See DAVIS, 
supra note 2, at 335–41. See also the discussion of “judicial bypass” mechanisms in abortion cases 
infra at notes 135–36 and accompanying text. For a criticism of the judicial bypass approach, see 
Hafen, The Learning Years, supra note 14, at 1059. 
 75.  For a defense of the chronological age rule approach, see Hafen, The Learning Years, 
supra note 14, at 1059. See also infra at notes 172, 188, 276. 
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that of the parent, or the child, or both.76 
The following discussion of Supreme Court cases is not intended 
to be exhaustive. The sample sufficiently demonstrates, however, the 
predominance of the protectionist point of view, and the rare excep-
tions that arguably recognize personhood rights. 
A. Protectionism 
As early as its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Pierce,77 the Supreme Court 
has alluded to the fact that children have constitutional rights. In in-
validating a statute that forbade the teaching of any language other 
than English until the eighth grade, the Meyer Court opined that con-
stitutionally protected liberty included not only the right of teachers 
to “engage in any of the common occupations of life,” and parents to 
“bring up children,” but also the right of the individual [presumably 
including children] to acquire useful knowledge.78 Twenty-one years 
after Meyer, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters79 declared unconsti-
tutional a statute requiring children between ages eight and sixteen to 
attend public schools rather than private parochial or military schools. 
In language similar to Meyer, the Pierce Court found the statute an un-
reasonable interference “with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children.”80 
If Meyer gave a nod in the direction of constitutional rights of chil-
dren, Prince v. Massachusetts81 decided in 1944 made clear that certain 
 
 76.  See, e.g., the discussion of the Meyer case, infra text and notes 77–78. 
 77.  Meyer v. Pierce, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 78.  Id. at 399. Assuming that Meyer does articulate an independent right in children to 
“acquire knowledge,” the right could be understood as a protectionist right. Education of chil-
dren is a necessity in the maturation process toward adulthood. Consistent with the idea, the 
Meyer Court noted that it was “the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suit-
able to their station in life.” Id. at 400. The Supreme Court would later hold, however, that edu-
cation is not a “fundamental right” entitled to strict constitutional scrutiny. San Antonio Public 
School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 79.  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 80.  Id. at 534–35. The Court added that the “child is not the mere creature of the State; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty to rec-
ognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535. 
 81.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 159 (1944). 
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rights available to adults are not granted to children.82 Despite the fact 
that “[i]t is cardinal . . . that the custody care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents,”83 the Prince Court held that a Jehovah’s 
Witness aunt could constitutionally be punished for permitting her 
nine-year-old niece to attempt to sell religious literature on a public 
street in violation of a state child labor statute prohibiting aiding a “girl 
under eighteen” in selling or offering to sell “any article” in a public 
place.84 Even though both the aunt and niece were ordained ministers 
and were engaging in a religious exercise by attempting to sell the lit-
erature, the Court found no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.85 
While recognizing that the aunt had a constitutional right to proselyt-
ize on the street, the niece had no similar right, as explained by the 
Court: 
Street preaching . . . for adults . . . cannot be wholly prohibited. . . . 
The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propa-
gandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other 
matters, may and at times does create situations difficult enough for 
adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially 
of tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, 
of emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury. Parents 
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow 
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their 
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion 
when they can make that choice for themselves.86 
 
 82.  Various other Supreme Court cases recognize the proposition that juveniles are not 
entitled to the same constitutional rights as adults. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 
(1968) (upholding a juvenile obscenity statute proscribing material that would not be obscene for 
adults); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (denying the right to trial by jury in 
juvenile court delinquency adjudications while such right exists in adult criminal trials); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying the “reasonable suspicion” Fourth Amendment 
standard to searches of school students rather than the more rigorous “probable cause” test often 
required for searches outside schools). 
 83.  Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 84.  Id. at 160–61, 170–71. 
 85.  Id. at 170. 
 86.  Id. at 169–70. Notwithstanding its language that children are too young “to make the 
choice” to practice religion, the Prince Court mentioned “the rights of children to exercise their 
religion and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of 
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The obvious protectionism of Prince87 is carried forward in most of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions addressing the constitutional rights of 
juveniles.88 For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder89 the Court reiterated 
“the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring”90 in 
holding that a state statute, requiring parents to enroll their children 
in public or private school until age sixteen, could not be applied to 
Amish parents who withdrew their children from school at age four-
teen for religious purposes.91 The Court dismissed the argument that 
exempting Amish children from the compulsory education require-
ment denied a “right of the Amish child to a secondary education,” 
emphasizing that it was the parents who were subject to prosecution 
under the statute.92 
In response to Justice Douglas’s claim in dissent that the wishes of 
the Amish children should be assessed before their parents were per-
mitted to withdraw them from school,93 the Court suggested that the 
 
religious belief.” Id. at 165. The Court identified the authority for these rights as West Virginia 
St. Bd. of Educ.v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), a case finding a state statutory requirement that 
school children salute the flag and pronounce the Pledge of Allegiance violative of the religious 
rights of Jehovah’s Witness students, and arguably their parents. 321 U.S. at 165–66. It is not 
entirely clear, however, that Barnette recognized an independent right in the students to practice 
their chosen religion given the fact that the students and their parents shared the same religious 
belief. 
 87.  The Prince Court noted that “the state as parens patriae” may act to “guard . . . the 
wellbeing” of youth, even sometimes where the state action restricts a parent’s control. Id. at 166. 
The Court emphasized that its “ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents.” Id. at 
171. 
 88.  For a thorough documentation of the Court’s virtually exclusive adherence to protec-
tionism in cases decided during the first three quarters of the Twentieth Century, see generally 
Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5. See also, Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 
511 (“Most of the Court’s children’s rights cases have dealt with . . . “protection rights” rather 
than “choice rights”). Dean Hafen has concluded that the “cases recognizing a choice [person-
hood] right for minors are essentially limited to those dealing with abortion.” Hafen, Constitu-
tional Status, supra note 4, at 512. 
 89.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 90.  Id. at 213. 
 91.  Id. at 235–36. 
 92.  Id. at 229–30. 
 93.  Id. at 230–31, 241–46. Douglas intimated that the children should be able to assert 
their claims against their parents: 
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children’s opinions were irrelevant: 
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible 
competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appro-
priate state court proceeding in which the power of the State is as-
serted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor 
children from attending high school despite their expressed desires 
to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the State in such a pro-
ceeding would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of 
parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their 
minor children recognized in this Court’s past decisions. It is clear 
that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of 
religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious free-
dom . . . On this record we neither reach nor decide those issues.94 
The Court was content to rest its decision on the “liberty of par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control” under Meyer95 and on the “rights of parents to 
direct religious upbringing of their children” under Pierce.96 
In Parham v. J.R., a rare case of a minor asserting a constitutional 
claim against his parent, the Court considered whether an adversary 
proceeding was required where a parent sought her child’s admission 
to a state mental hospital.97 While recognizing that such children pos-
 
On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be entitled 
to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, 
the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views. 
He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he will 
have to break from the Amish tradition. 
Id. at 244–45. 
 94.  Id. at 231–32. 
 95.  Id. at 232–33. The Court found that living under the Amish way of life was in no way 
harmful to Amish children, in fact, their system of “learning-by-doing” prepared with an ideal 
vocational training. Id. at 223–25. 
 96.  Id. at 233. 
 97.  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham also involved non-parent guardians who 
sought hospitalization of children in their charge. 
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sess constitutionally protected liberty interests in not being unneces-
sarily confined,98 the Court found that the parental interest in obtain-
ing mental health care for their children predominated.99 Noting the 
“traditional presumption that parents act in the best interests of their 
child,”100 the Court took a clearly protectionist stance in stating that 
“[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make 
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for 
medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those judg-
ments.”101 Moreover, the Court was reluctant to require adversarial 
proceedings, which would entail the child, through counsel, “to probe 
the motives” of her parents, thus involving the Courts in “private fam-
ily matters” in determining whether the child should be admitted to 
the hospital.102 
A final example of the Court’s commitment to protectionism is re-
flected in its cases granting procedural rights to defendants in juvenile 
court waiver and adjudication proceedings.103 In imposing procedural 
protections on a juvenile justice system historically eschewing virtually 
all procedural formalities, the Court did not equate juveniles with 
adults,104 but instead recognized that minority status did not justify ad-




 98.  Id. at 600. The Court noted that a child has a “substantial liberty interest in not being 
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment” which might produce “adverse social conse-
quences for the child” through being stigmatized as one having been hospitalized for psychiatric 
care. 
 99.  Id. at 604. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 603. The Court offered no empirical support for its conclusion and made no 
reference to the emerging data regarding the cognitive competence of adolescents. See supra text 
and notes 53–59; Melton, supra note 12. 
 102.  Parham, 442 U.S. at 605. 
 103.  For a summary of these decisions, see Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and 
Public Trials by Jury; Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1, 
25–34 (2012) [Hereinafter Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice]. 
 104.  Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 511–12. 
 105.  See e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (“[T]he condition of a boy does not justify 
a kangaroo court”). 
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its blessing to a continuation of a juvenile court system dedicated to 
addressing the unique needs of young people.106 
B. Protectionist or Personhood? 
Unlike the cases just discussed, some of the Court’s cases are am-
biguous, suggesting either a protectionist or personhood interpreta-
tion. Tinker v. Des Moines School District107 represents such a case.108 
Tinker involved a group of parents who organized an effort to protest 
the Vietnam War, encouraging their children to participate by wearing 
black armbands to school in violation of a school regulation forbidding 
such activity.109 The students were suspended from school for violating 
the rule and defended their actions by arguing that the rule violated 
their First Amendment rights to free speech.110 The Supreme Court 
agreed, stating that students as “persons’ under our Constitution”111 do 
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”112 
Tinker has generally been understood as a case granting person-
hood rights to students to express political viewpoints at school.113 
Some, however, read the case as a parents’ rights case implicating both 
the child-rearing and free speech rights of the parents.114 
 
 106.  In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971), a plurality of the Court noted 
that it was “reluctant to say that . . . [the juvenile court system] still does not hold promise.” The 
plurality encouraged the states to “seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the 
problems of the young.” Id. 
 107.  Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 108.  The ambiguous nature of Tinker is no better illustrated than by noting Dean Samuel 
Davis’s interpretation(s) of the case. On the one hand, Davis characterizes the case as the Su-
preme Court’s “first ‘pure’ children’s rights case.” DAVIS, supra note 2, at 45. On the other hand, 
Dean Davis observes that the case could be viewed as “a parents’ rights or family rights case . . . .” 
Id. at 47. 
 109.  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 110.  Id. at 504–05. 
 111.  Id. at 511. 
 112.  Id. at 506. 
 113.  See, e.g., SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 21–
23 (3d ed. 2008). 
 114.  Given the fact that the views of the students mirrored those of the parents in Tinker, 
“one might ask whether the Court would be as protective of children’s rights if their views were 
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If Tinker is a personhood rights case, its significance as such has 
waned with subsequent decisions. Tinker has been characterized as the 
“high-water mark in children’s rights in the Supreme Court.”115 In 
subsequent school cases the Court has expressed protectionist princi-
ples in denying student free speech claims in contexts of student as-
semblies,116 school newspapers,117 and a student’s display of a contro-
versial banner during the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay.118 Similarly, in 
 
contrary to parental wishes.” DAVIS, supra note 2, at 47. See also Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra 
note 4, at 512 (“[B]oth childrearing and the free speech rights of the Tinker parents were arguably 
implicated in the case.”). 
 115.  RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 113, at 23–28. But see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc., 
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (recognizing First Amendment rights of minors to access violent video 
games). 
 116.  Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The Fraser Court rejected the claims 
of a student (Fraser) who argued that his rights to free speech were violated when school officials 
suspended him for giving a speech deemed inappropriate during a school assembly. The speech, 
presented to nominate a fellow student for a student government office, was laced with sexual 
innuendo that the officials viewed as violative of a school rule providing “conduct which . . . 
interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane lan-
guage or gestures.” Id. at 678. The Court distinguished Tinker as a case involving political dis-
course, unlike Fraser’s speech, and found that the school had an interest in preparing students 
for citizenship by inculcating “habits and manners of civility.” Id. at 681. The Court further ob-
served that school authorities act in loco parentis in protecting its student body “from exposure to 
sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech. Id. at 634. See, Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students 
Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49 (1996), 
and Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as 
Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1987), for defenses of student rights as grounded in 
protectionism rather than personhood 
 117.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Kuhlmeir, the Court up-
held the actions of a school principal who exercised editorial control over the contents of articles 
written by student staff members for their school newspaper. Id. at 263–64. The Court rejected 
First Amendment claims of the students after the principle deleted the articles, viewing them as 
offensive and inappropriate, in an attempt to protect immature students who were part of the 
audience for the newspaper. Id. at 267–73. 
 118.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). The Morse Court upheld the actions of a 
principal who suspended students who refused to take down a banner reading “BONG HITS 4 
JESUS,” which the principal considered to advocate illegal drug use. Id. at 397–98. The Court 
found that the principal had a responsibility to protect students from speech that reasonably could 
be regarded as advocating illegal drug use, a responsibility that outweighed the students’ claims 
that the banner constituted protected speech. Id. at 408–10. 
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school search and seizure cases the Court has accorded less than full 
Fourth Amendment protection to students, recognizing broad power 
in educators to oversee the school environment.119 
Like Tinker, Carey v. Population Services International120 is a case that 
some understand as recognizing personhood rights but others see as 
grounded in protectionism. In Carey, the Supreme Court struck down 
a New York statute banning, inter alia, distribution of contraceptives 
to anyone under age sixteen.121 The Court rejected the State’s argu-
ment that prohibiting access of contraceptives constituted a constitu-
tionally permissible regulation of promiscuous sexual activity among 
the young.122 A plurality of Justices noted that “[s]tate restrictions in-
hibiting privacy rights of minors are valid only if they serve . . . ‘[a] 
significant state interest that is not present in the case of an adult.’”123 
Finding that the “right to privacy in connection with decisions affect-
ing procreation extends to minors as well as to adults,”124 the plural-
ity125 ruled that the statute could not reasonably achieve the State in-
terest of deterring sexual activity.126 However, the Court left open the 
 
 119.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
applies to schools but is subject to a “reasonable suspicion” standard rather than the traditional 
“probable cause” test, in part because students enjoy lesser privacy expectation). See Martin R. 
Gardner, The Fourth Amendment and the Public Schools: Observations on an Unsettled State of Search 
and Seizure Law, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 373, 374–380 (2000), for an argument that T.L.O. grants 
broad deference to school officials to search students and minimal privacy protection to students. 
See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random urinalysis 
searches of all athletes at a high school). The Acton Court found minimal student privacy interests 
involved in the case and saw the school as the temporary custodian of its students which for many 
purposes “act[s] in loco parentis.” Id. at 655; Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (uphold-
ing a requirement for all students participating in any extracurricular activity to consent to a 
urinalysis search). But see Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (finding 
strip search of student violates Fourth Amendment). 
 120.  Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 121.  Id. at 681–82. 
 122.  Id. at 691–96. 
 123.  Id. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), discussed 
infra at text accompanying notes 128–134). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Only Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun recognized the privacy right 
extension to minors. Id. at 691 n.12. 
 126.  Id. at 695. 
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question of whether discouraging sexual activity of minors was itself an 
unconstitutional infringement of protected privacy, observing that its 
“decision proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not 
bar state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors.”127 At the same 
time the Court noted that access to contraceptives “is essential to ex-
ercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of 
childbearing.”128 Thus, the Court was clear that minors have a consti-
tutional right to possess contraceptives, which they may or may not 
have a constitutional right to use. Concurring Justices White and Ste-
vens specified where they stood on whether minors have a privacy right 
to engage in premarital sexual activity, viewing as “frivolous” the argu-
ment that a minor has a constitutional right “to put contraceptives to 
their intended use notwithstanding the combined objection of both 
parents and the State.”129 
While some interpret Carey demonstrating the Court’s support of 
a minor’s “right to decide whether or not to beget a child,”130 others 
see the case as grounded in protectionism, claiming that Carey reflects 
the Court’s belief that the statute did not grant a “right to procrea-
tion,”131 but rather failed to deter sexual activity of minors. On this 
view, the “real fear” in Carey was that the denial of contraceptives left 
sexually active minors unprotected from the risks of “unwanted preg- 
 
 
 127.  Id. at 694 n.17. 
 128.  Id. at 688. In a dissenting opinion in a later case, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
White noted that “[m]inors. . . enjoy a right of privacy in connection with decisions affecting 
procreation,” claiming that “it is not settled that a State may rely on a pregnancy-prevention 
justification to make consensual sexual intercourse among minors a criminal act.” Michael M. v. 
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 491 n.5 (1981) (upholding California’s statutory rape provision 
punishing only males against an equal protection challenge) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
In the context of an adult attack on a state fornication statute, one court remarked that “[n]eces-
sarily implicit in the right to make decisions regarding childbearing is the right to engage in 
sexual intercourse.” Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D. Va. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 
782 F. 2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 129.  Id. at 702–03 (White, J., concurring, quoting Stevens, J., concurring at 713). 
 130.  See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 2, at 88. 
 131.  See, e.g., Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4, at 512. 
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nancy and venereal disease”132 thus rendering Carey a “protection 
rights case.”133 
C. Personhood Rights—the Abortion Cases 
It is widely understood that certain cases granting minor women 
the right to terminate their pregnancies constitute the clearest, if not 
the only, examples of Supreme Court recognition of juvenile person-
hood rights.134 The leading case is Planned Parenthood v. Danforth in 
which the Court invalidated a state statute that, inter alia, conditioned 
a minor’s ability to obtain an abortion on the consent of her parent.135 
Viewing the case as “an anticipated corollary to Roe v. Wade,”136 the 
Planned Parenthood Court found that “[m]inors as well as adults . . . 
possess constitutional rights.”137 The Court rejected the argument that 
permitting a minor to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an 
adult having responsibility for the child would be an abdication of “the 
State’s duty to protect the welfare of minors,”138 declaring that “[c]on-
stitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only 
when one attains the state-defined age of majority.”139 Permitting mi-
nors to obtain abortions without parental consent posed no threat to 
parental authority or family unity in the eyes of the Court. Judging the 
privacy right of the minor to be at least the equivalent of her parents’ 
rights to rear their child, the Court proclaimed: “Any independent in-
terest the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter’s 
 
 132.  Id. at 512–13 (quoting Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 715 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part)). 
 133.  Id. at 513. 
 134.  See, e.g., id. at 514: “[T]he right of minors to obtain abortions without parental con-
sent has become the major exception to the Court’s overall posture [against] granting [person-
hood] rights to minors.” 
 135.  Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 136.  Id. at 55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing an unfettered right of privacy 
for pregnant women to decide with her physician to terminate her pregnancy during the first 
trimester of the pregnancy). 
 137.  Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 74. 
 138.  Id. at 72–73 (quoting Brief for Appellee Danforth at 44). 
 139.  Id. at 74. 
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pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the compe-
tent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”140 
Planned Parenthood did not establish that every minor, regardless of 
age or maturity, is entitled to give effective consent for termination of 
her pregnancy. In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court recognized that some 
pregnant minors may in fact be too immature to make the abortion 
decision.141 Therefore, the Court authorized a procedure for a preg-
nant minor to bypass her parents and obtain judicial consent for an 
abortion by demonstrating either that (1) she is sufficiently mature to 
make an informed decision to terminate her pregnancy or (2) that even 
if she is incapable of making her own decision an abortion would be in 
her best interests.142 
Despite Bellotti’s seeming recognition of personhood rights, Justice 
Powell in his plurality opinion for the Court observed that while mi-
nors are “not beyond the protection of the constitution,” their “pecu-
liar vulnerability [,] their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner [,] and the importance of the parental role in 
child rearing” meant that “the constitutional rights of children cannot 
be equated with those of adults.”143 Further justifying the need for ju-
dicial oversight of the abortion decision, the Court voiced a view sim-
 
 140.  Id. at 75. The Court’s views are in sharp contrast to those taken in the Parham case. 
See supra text and notes 68–73. Planned Parenthood may appear at first glance as a clear accommo-
dation to “pro-choice” advocates of abortion rights. However, had the case recognized a parent’s 
right to veto their daughter’s decisions to terminate her pregnancy, it would follow that a corre-
sponding parental right would exist to impose an abortion on a daughter desiring to have her baby. 
See Hartman, supra note 12, at 1346–47. Such a situation would clearly be offensive to “pro-life” 
interests. For a case holding that a mother could not invoke state status offense jurisdiction over 
“incorrigible, ungovernable, and habitually disobedient” children because of her daughter’s re-
fusal to have an abortion, see In re Mary P., 444 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981). The Court 
found that Planned Parenthood’s privacy protections extend not only to a right to abort but also to 
“the decision to give birth.” Id. at 547. 
 141.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 142.  Id. at 643–44, 647–48. 
 143.  Id. at 633–34. For criticism of these views as “dubious in light of scientific studies 
suggesting adolescent decisional ability,” see Hartman, supra note 12, at 1348; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 55–61. 
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ilar to that later expressed in Parham, again with no empirical sup-
port:144 “[A]dolescen[ts] . . . often lack the experience, perspective, and 
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to 
them.”145 
Bellotti thus blest a system that assessed, on a case-by-case basis,146 
the maturity of minors seeking to terminate their pregnancies. Those 
found sufficiently mature are granted the personhood right to make 
their own decision, while those deemed immature are protected by a 
judicial judgment promoting “her best interests.”147 
Significantly, the Bellotti Court suggested that recognition of a mi-
nor’s personhood rights might be limited to the abortion context, not-
ing that the abortion decision “differs in important ways from other 
decisions that may be made during minority.”148 Unlike other rights, 
such as marriage that are denied minors only temporarily, “a pregnant 
adolescent cannot preserve . . . for long the possibility of aborting, 
which effectively expires in a matter of weeks after the onset of preg-
nancy.”149 Moreover, “unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally 
burdensome for a minor,” given likely lack of education, employment 
skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity.150 “In sum,” noted 
the Court, “there are few situations in which denying a minor the right 
to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and 
indelible.”151 
D. Parental Rights 
As the above discussion makes clear, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized parents’ rights to raise their children and to make decisions 
 
 144.  See supra text accompanying notes 97–102 
 145.  Parham v. J.R., 443 U.S. at 635 (1979). 
 146.  Such an individualized assessment of maturity constitutes a sharp break from the tra-
ditional appeal to chronological age as defining adulthood. See supra text accompanying notes 
68–73. 
 147.  Parham, 443 U.S. at 647–48. 
 148.  Id. at 642. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
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in their behalf.152 Except in the contexts of abortion,153 and state inter-
ventions made necessary in cases of parental neglect or abuse,154 these 
rights are generally honored as essential to the child’s maturation to 
responsible adulthood. In summarizing its case law, the Court ob-
served that “constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized 
that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct 
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.”155 
Even in the context of abortion, where states have imposed parental 
notification requirements prior to a minor’s abortion, the Court has 
recognized a parental role in participating in the abortion decision as 
consistent with “the important considerations of family integrity and 
protecting adolescents.”156 
In a case dealing with the rights of an unwed father to a parental 
relationship with his children, impeded by a statute making the chil-
dren wards of the state upon the death of their mother,157 the Court 
said: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired 
and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a 
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his 
or her children “come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect 
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from 
shifting economic arrangements.”158 
 
 
 152.  See supra text accompanying notes77–80, 89–102. 
 153.  See supra text accompanying notes134–140. 
 154.  See DAVIS, supra note 2, at 165–75. 
 155.  H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 639 (1968)). 
 156.  Id. at 411. The Court made the statement assuming that minors were “immature and 
dependent.” Id. See also Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) 
(upholding a parental notification statute which provided a judicial bypass procedure for pregnant 
minors who establish that (1) they are sufficiently mature to make an intelligent decision to ter-
minate their pregnancies without notice to their parents or (2) that they have suffered abuse at 
the hands of their parents). 
 157.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 
95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 158.  Id. at 651. 
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In a subsequent case, the Court described parental rights as the 
“care, custody, and control of their children” as “perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”159 Such 
statements, as well as the general protectionist tenor of the Court’s 
juvenile rights cases, make clear that a child faces substantial difficulties 
in successfully asserting constitutional claims that conflict with her 
parents’ reasonable attempts to care for, protect, and control the child. 
IV. The Juvenile Punishment Cases 
In sharp contrast to the cases discussed in the previous section—
where the Supreme Court made no attempt to ground its decisions in 
social science data—in a series of cases deciding Eighth Amendment 
issues, the Court directly appealed to empirical data in finding adoles-
cents to be categorically different from adults for purposes of Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause analysis.160 The following review of 
the punishment cases will describe the Court’s view of the nature of 
adolescence and address whether that view may extend beyond the 
context of criminal punishment to other areas of juvenile law. 
A. The Death Penalty Cases 
In the first in a series of cases questioning the constitutionality of 
imposing the death penalty on criminal defendants161 who committed 
murder while juveniles, the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma162 held that 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
forbids inflicting capital punishment on offenders who commit murder 
when fifteen-years-old or younger. In finding that children that young 
 
 159.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (statute permitting “any person” to peti-
tion for rights to visit minor children held to be an unconstitutional violation of parental rights). 
 160.  See Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons: The Role of the Science Brief, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 369 (2006). 
 161.  The cases all involve criminal, rather than juvenile, court convictions. For a discussion 
of various mechanisms for waiving jurisdiction from juvenile to criminal court, see GARDNER, 
supra note 26, at 188–90. 
 162.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
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are not capable of acting with sufficient culpability to justify the ulti-
mate penalty, the Court163 appealed to “the experience of mankind” as 
evidence of the differences that exist between young people and adults, 
which must be acknowledged in determining the rights and duties of 
minors and adults respectively.164 The Court observed that there is 
“broad agreement” that adolescents are “less mature and responsible 
than adults.”165 They are also “more vulnerable, more impulsive and 
less self-disciplined than adults.”166 Thus, less culpability should attach 
to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime com-
mitted by an adult. While the basis for this conclusion was “too obvi-
ous to require extended explanation,”167 the Court nevertheless ex-
plained “[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the 
teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct 
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by 
mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.”168 Interestingly, the 
Court footnoted a host of social science data supporting its conclusions 
about adolescents but did not directly relate the studies to its analy-
sis.169 
The social science data referenced in Thompson burst to the fore-
front in Roper v. Simmons,170 which held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits execution of offenders who were under age eighteen at the 
 
 163.  A four-justice plurality issued the opinion for the Court. 
 164.  Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824–25. In addition to its conclusion that adolescents are less 
culpable than adults, the Court also grounded its holding on the “evolving standards of decency” 
as reflected by the reluctance of state legislatures and juries to impose the death penalty on of-
fenders under age sixteen who commit capital crimes. Id. at 821–31. 
 165.  Id. at 834. 
 166.  Id. (quoting 1978 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing 
Policy Toward Young Offenders as quoted in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 
(1982)). 
 167. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  “The . . . decision in Thompson does not speak explicitly in the language of adolescent 
development or support its arguments with scientific research on adolescents’ capacities.” Law-
rence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immatu-
rity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1013 
(2003). 
 170.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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time they committed capital crimes.171 The infrequency of state impo-
sition of the death penalty on juveniles,172 coupled with empirical evi-
dence suggesting differences between adolescents and adults, con-
vinced the Court that juveniles are “categorically less culpable” than 
average adult offenders,173 thus rendering them immune from the 
death penalty. 
Appealing directly to recent studies, the Court identified three 
general characteristics of adolescents that differentiate them from 
adults: (1) “[a] lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsi-
bility”174 manifesting itself in propensities to engage in reckless behav-
ior and impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions; (2) a vul-
nerability and susceptibility to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) less character development 
than adults with more transitory, and fewer fixed, personality traits.175 
Rejecting traditional arguments in favor of case-by-case assessments in 
assessing culpability in administering the death penalty,176 the Court 
concluded: “The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are 
too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to 
receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”177 
In addition to lack of culpability, the Court emphasized that due 
to the transitory nature of their character development, adolescent of-
fenders are uniquely amenable to rehabilitation. The Court noted that 
“it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of 
 
 171.  Between the time of Thompson and Roper, the Court decided Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989), which upheld imposition of the death penalty for murderers who were six-
teen or seventeen-years-old at the time of their crimes. Justice Scalia dismissed as “ethicoscien-
tific” an array of evidence similar to that cited in Thompson showing the differences between 
adolescents and adults. Id. at 377–78. On the other hand, Justice Brennan in dissent was per-
suaded by studies showing that adolescents have less capacity than adults “to think in long range 
terms,” while having “little fear of death,” and possessing “a profound conviction of their own . . . 
immortality.” Id. at 404–05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 172.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67. 
 173.  Id. at 567. 
  174. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359–62, (1993). 
 175.  Id. at 569–70. 
 176.  Id. at 572. 
 177.  Id. at 572–73. 
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an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character defi-
ciencies will be reformed.”178 
In fashioning its categorical rule, the Court argued that fixing the 
line for eligibility for the death penalty at age eighteen was not an ar-
bitrary choice,179 noting that in light of the transitory personality de-
velopment of adolescents, psychiatrists are subject to a rule forbidding 
them from diagnosing any patient under age eighteen as having a per-
sonality disorder.180 Moreover, the “age of eighteen is the point where 
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adult-
hood.”181 
Justice Scalia in dissent called into question the Court’s appeal to 
social science evidence. In addition to raising questions about possible 
methodological problems with the studies,182 Scalia cited the studies 
described above—for him contradicting the Court’s conclusion that 
adolescents lack the ability to take moral responsibility for their deci-
sions—showing that “by middle adolescence (age 14–15) young people 
develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas, 
understanding social rules and laws, and reasoning about interpersonal 
relationships and interpersonal problems.”183 Scalia also chided the 
Court for its categorical rule, claiming that the studies cited by the 
Court offer “scant support” for a categorical prohibition, showing at 
 
 178.  Id. at 570. 
 179.  Observing that “the relevant differences between “adults” and “juveniles” appear to 
be a matter of degree rather than of kind,” Justice O’Connor in dissent disagreed: 
Chronological age is not an unfailing measure of psychological development, and 
common experience suggests that many 17-year-olds are more mature than the aver-
age young “adult.” In short, the class of offenders exempted from capital punishment 
by today’s decision is too broad and too diverse to warrant a categorical prohibition. 
Indeed, the age-based line drawn by the Court is indefensibly arbitrary—it quite likely 
will protect a number of offenders who are mature enough to deserve the death penalty 
and may well leave vulnerable many who are not. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 600–02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 180.  Id. at 573. 
 181.  Id. at 574. 
 182.  Id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 183.  Id. at 617–18 (citing Brief for APA as Amicus Curiae, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. 
S. 417 (1990) (No. 88-805) at pp. 19–20 (citations omitted)). See supra text accompanying notes 
55–61 for a discussion of the studies. 
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most that “on average . . . persons under 18 are unable to take respon-
sibility for their actions,” and not that “all individuals under 18 are un-
able to appreciate the nature of their crimes.”184 Citing Bellotti and 
Planned Parenthood,185 Scalia observed that “at least some minors will 
be mature enough to make difficult decisions that involve moral con-
siderations,” concluding that “[w]hether to obtain an abortion is surely 
a much more complex decision for a young person than whether to kill 
an innocent person.”186 
B. The Mandatory Life Imprisonment Cases 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court reiterated the 
Roper categorical distinction between adolescents and adults in holding 
unconstitutional mandatory life imprisonment sentences for offenders  
committing non-homicide crimes when under eighteen-years-of-
age.187 
After finding a national consensus against the use of mandatory life 
sentences for juveniles committing crimes other than homicide,188 the 
Court addressed the question of juvenile culpability. Reaffirming the 
Roper three-component recognition of adolescent/adult differences,189 
the Court noted that “developments in psychology and brain science 
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds.”190 
The Court again emphasized that juvenile offenders manifest a 
unique “capacity for change,” which makes them “most . . . receptive 
to rehabilitation.”191 A sentence of life without parole eliminates the 
possibility of rehabilitation.192 Given the limited culpability of juveniles 
and the severity of life-without-parole sentences, coupled with juvenile 
 
 184.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 618 (emphasis omitted). 
 185.  See supra notes 135–147 and accompanying text. 
 186.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 620. 
 187.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 188.  Id. at 2023–27. 
 189.  Id. at 2026–27. See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 191.  Id. at 2030. 
 192.  Id. 
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offenders’ amenability to rehabilitation, the Court concluded that such 
sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment.193 
As in Roper, the Graham Court defended the “clear line” of age 
eighteen as the basis for distinguishing juveniles and adults, repeating 
Roper’s reliance on that age as “the point where society draws the 
line.”194 In defense of its “categorical” rejection of mandatory sen-
tences, the Court downplayed a case-by-case sentencing approach, 
noting that even if we were to assume that some juvenile non-homicide 
offenders might have “sufficient psychological maturity and at the 
same time demonstrate sufficient depravity” to merit a life-without-
parole sentence, it does not follow that courts taking a case-by-case 
proportionality approach could, with sufficient accuracy, distinguish  
the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the 
capacity for change.195 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the ma-
jority that “Roper’s conclusion that juveniles are typically less culpable 
than adults has pertinence beyond capital cases,”196 but opposed a cat-
egorical rule outside the death penalty context.197 Treating life sen-
tences as analogous to capital punishment was, for Roberts, “at odds 
with [the] longstanding view that ‘the death penalty is different from 
other punishments in kind rather than degree.’”198 
Shortly after Graham, the Court in Miller v. Alabama199 again ex-
tended Eighth Amendment protection in finding it cruel and unusual 
punishment to impose mandatory life sentences without parole for 
those committing murder when under age eighteen at the time of their 
crimes.200 The Court once more emphasized the Roper/Graham posi-
 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 2032 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572) (citations omitted). 
 196.  Id. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 197.  Id. at 2038–39, 2041–42. 
 198.  Id. at 2038–39 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983)). Justice Thomas, 
in dissent, agreed. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046–49 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 199.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 200.  Id. at 2475. 
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tion that “children are constitutionally different from adults for pur-
poses of sentencing,”201 finding in fact that the science supporting 
those differences had become “even stronger,”202 while observing that 
the logic of Graham was not limited to non-homicide cases. “[N]one 
of what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive . . . men-
tal traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime specific.”203 The 
Court concluded that sentencing a juvenile to mandatory life without 
parole precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hall-
mark features—among them “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences,” as well as “the possibility of reha-
bilitation.”204 As in Graham, Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Miller. 
Identifying the principle behind the majority’s decision to be “that be-
cause juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced dif-
ferently,”205 Roberts saw no logical way to avoid the eventual uncon-
stitutionality of all criminal punishment of juveniles under that 
principle.206 
C. The Adolescent/Adult Distinction: Implications Beyond Punishment 
Contexts 
The punishment cases constitute an unambiguous expression of 
protectionist rights. Moreover, the cases constitute the Court’s first 
attempt to identify the dissimilarity between adults and juveniles 
through the use of social science evidence.207 A leading commentator 
 
 201.  Id. at 2464. 
 202.  Id. at 2465, n.5. 
 203.  Id. at 2465. 
 204.  Id. at 2468. 
 205.  Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 206.  Id. at 2482. One year prior to Miller, the Court referred to Roper and Graham in con-
cluding that juveniles “are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures than adults.” 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (holding that age is a relevant factor to 
be taken into account when deciding whether a suspect is in “custody” for purposes of deciding 
whether or not Miranda warnings must be given). 
 207.  Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision-making: Reduced Culpability in the Criminal Justice 
System and Recognition of Complexity in Other Legal Contexts, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 375, 
388 n.124 (2011) (“Roper was the first time the Supreme Court applied psychological studies to 
the area of juvenile law”). 
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has observed that “the Court has broken new ground in a scientific 
venture to decipher the young minds of those who violate the law.”208 
While the cases are clearly significant in criminal, and arguably juve-
nile, justice areas,209 it is unclear how wide-ranging their precedential 
value will be.210 
Three possibilities appear: (1) the protectionist concept expressed 
in the punishment cases could be limited to responsibility assessments 
of juveniles in punishment regimes; (2) the concept could extend be-
yond issues of juvenile responsibility to any determination of the rights 
of juveniles; or (3) the concept could extend outside punishment con-
texts to some, but not all, identifications of juvenile rights and respon-
sibilities. The following discussion suggests that if the Court continues 
to be influenced by extant social science, the third possibility is the 
most likely. 
1. Punishment only 
The three adolescent characteristics identified by the Court in the 
punishment cases— (1) propensity to engage in reckless (risky) behav-
ior, (2) susceptibility to peer pressure, and (3) transitory character de-
velopment—all speak directly to culpability issues and amenability to 
rehabilitation within the criminal and juvenile justice systems. The 
first two characteristics suggest that the retributive and deterrent goals 
of punishment are less applicable to minors than to adults,211 while the 
third consideration supports the view that the interest of punitive sys-
tems in lengthy incapacitation of dangerous offenders is less applicable 
to juveniles given their unique potential for rehabilitation.212 Apart 
from the context of state regulation of sexual activity discussed later in 
this paper, it is difficult to imagine other juvenile law settings where all 
 
 208.  Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 379, 384 (2006). 
 209.  See Justice Roberts’s observation, supra text accompanying note 206. 
 210.  See Denno, supra note 208, at 396; Schad, supra note 207, at 388 (“In the future, sup-
port for neuroscience and psychology will most likely continue to influence the Court’s reasoning 
regarding juvenile punishment, and may also begin to affect other areas of juvenile law.”). 
 211.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2028–29 (2010); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65. 
 212.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. See supra text accompanying notes 177, 191–193, and 204. 
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three of the characteristics the Court found so relevant to punishment 
issues would be equally apposite.213 
Yet, the import of the punishment cases seems to extend beyond 
punishment contexts to any situation in which the three characteristics 
(or any of them?) are relevant in deciding the given controversy. As 
one commentator noted, “[t]o the extent that researchers can reliably 
identify contexts in which adolescents are likely to make competent 
decisions, and others in which they are less likely to do so, develop-
mental science might usefully inform law or policy.”214 Another ob-
served that the “possible applications of the ‘kids are just different’ ar-
gument [of the punishment cases] abound” in a variety of contexts 
including such things as the ability to enter into contracts.215 
2. Universal protectionism 
At the other extreme, it could be argued that the Court has finally 
settled on a thoroughgoing recognition of protectionist rights, based 
on sound social science and applicable to all contexts of juvenile law, 
thus answering the call for a systematic and “coherent, consistent pol-
icy with respect to children’s rights.”216 To the extent that the punish-
ment cases recognize immutable characteristics of adolescence, the 
cases suggest that once and for all the Court has embraced the view 
that “juveniles, as a class, have unique needs for protection and guid-
ance that are greater than and different from the needs of adults.”217 
 
 213.  Professor Emily Buss has cautioned that the research utilized in the punishment cases 
“may be most useful, and least dangerous, whereas in the context of juvenile antisocial behavior, 
it confirms conventional wisdom and therefore supports policies safely within the mainstream.” 
Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection between Developmental Science and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 493, 494 (2009). See infra notes 258–365 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the 
constitutionality of fornication statues applied to minors. 
 214.  Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1099. 
 215.  Eliza Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy after Roper v. Simmons: “Kids Are Just Differ-
ent” and “Kids Are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273, 
274 (2008). 
 216.  See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 217.  Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment through the Lens of Childhood Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 292, 297 
(2012) (commenting that the scientific research utilized in the punishment cases “fully back[s]” 
the view that “kids are different”). 
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Such a finding would appear to preclude recognition of personhood 
rights for juveniles. 
Interpreting the social science conclusions buttressing the punish-
ment cases as committing the Court exclusively to an immutable pro-
tectionist concept of juvenile rights may be mistaken, however, for sev-
eral reasons. In the first place, no scientific data ever settles anything 
indefinitely. As Emily Buss points out, even the most careful reliance 
on the best developmental research is subject to change over time.218 
Overreliance on scientific evidence runs the risk that the law “will lock 
in a development status quo” that might eventually turn out to be mis-
guided.219 Moreover, Professor Buss notes that “context clearly plays a 
role in minors’ development, and expectations and experiences can ac-
celerate or slow down minors’ progress toward maturity.”220 Therefore 
“there is nothing inherent about an adolescent’s blameworthiness 
however well we understand the progress of their development, and it 
is up to the law, not developmental science, to assign that blame,” in 
light of not just scientific, but also legal and moral, considerations.221 
Additional considerations argue against unlimited extension of the 
rationale of the punishment cases. While the cases provide scientific 
support for traditional protectionist principles holding that adoles-
cents are different from adults, as mentioned above, other research—
reflected in the Supreme Court’s abortion case law— indicates no dif-
ferences, at least in contexts such as medical treatment decision mak-
ing.222 Thus, in the words of one commentator, “the state can, does, 
and should distinguish between the competence necessary to have an 
abortion—and the relative moral blameworthiness and capacity for 
change that justifies differential treatment when accused of a crime.”223 
 
 
 218.  Buss, supra note 213, at 508. 
 219.  Id. at 508–09. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 510. Professor Vivian Hamilton adds: “Policy making . . . often requires definite, 
clearly bounded categories. Developmental science may usefully inform but cannot determine 
these.” Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1117. 
 222.  See supra text accompanying notes 53–57, 126–137. 
 223.  Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 159 (2009). 
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However, this seeming conflict between the protectionism of the 
punishment cases and the personhood underpinnings of the abortion 
context can be explained, if not reconciled, by viewing the abortion 
decisions as sui generis.224 Thus, juveniles would possess protectionist 
rights in all situations except abortion decision making. 
Whatever the legal and policy merits of such a view, leading social 
scientists argue that sound empirical data provides the basis for a 
broader recognition of personhood rights while, at the same time, em-
bracing the science underlying the protectionism of the punishment 
cases. They argue that no contradiction is involved in holding that ad-
olescents function like adults in some contexts and differently in oth-
ers: 
[W]e believe that the . . . seemingly contradictory positions in [abor-
tion decision making] and [culpability for criminal offenses] are in 
fact quite compatible with research on age differences in cognitive 
and psychosocial capacities. More specifically, our findings, as well as 
those of other researchers, suggest that whereas adolescents and 
adults perform comparably on cognitive tests measuring the sorts of 
cognitive abilities [entailed in abortion decisions], abilities that per-
mit logical reasoning about moral, social and interpersonal matters—
adolescents and adults are not of equal maturity with respect to the 
psychosocial capacities listed by [the Court] in Roper—capacities such 
as impulse control and resistance to peer influence. Not only were 
the legal issues different in the . . . cases, but so are the circumstances 
surrounding abortion decisions and criminal behavior, and therefore, 
the relevant dimensions along which adolescents and adults should 
be compared differ as well. Unlike adolescents’ decisions to commit 
crimes, which are usually rash and made in the presence of peers,  
 
 
 224.  See the Court’s comments in Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622 (1979), supra notes 141–
144 and accompanying text. Professor Elizabeth Scott argues that “many . . . features distinguish 
abortion from routine medical decisions, and give rise to arguments that pregnant teens should 
be deemed adults in this context.” Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 569–70 (2000). In addition to noting the concerns expressed in Bellotti, 
Professor Scott suggests a protectionist element involved in permitting minors to make abortion 
decisions: “[G]iven the health risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and the consequences for the 
girl’s future welfare, the paternalistic argument for making abortion available to minors is a pow-
erful one.” Id. at 570. 
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adolescents’ decisions about terminating a pregnancy can be made in 
an unhurried fashion and in consultation with adults.225 
On this view, the boundary between adolescence and adulthood 
should be drawn differently for some purposes than for others.226 For 
decision-making contexts that allow for unhurried logical reflection, 
adolescents might generally and justifiably be treated as adults.227 At 
the same time, in situations involving emotional arousal, pressure from 
peers, or risky and impulsive behavior, the protectionism embodied in 
the punishment cases should prevail.228 
 
 225.  Laurence Steinberg et al., supra note 62, at 586. Professor Vivian Hamilton adds: 
[T]he ability to reason reaches mature levels by mid-adolescence, around age six-
teen. . . . The heightened vulnerability to risk taking that peaks in middle adolescence 
before declining is normative; to the extent that it has a neurobiological basis, efforts 
to reduce risk taking through education will have limited success. While adolescents 
have the cognitive capacities to make rational decisions, real-world contexts and stress-
ors will continue to confound their capacities and impede their decision-making. So 
far, only aging (and, presumably, the neural development that attends it) reliably and 
significantly correlates with decreases in adolescent risk taking. As a result of this on-
going development, adolescents’ decision-making abilities will be both age dependent 
and context specific. 
Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1118. See also Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging 
a Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 6 NEV. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006) (distinguishing between adolescent competence in 
“formal” and “informal” settings). 
 226.  Steinberg et al., supra note 62, at 592. 
 227.  Id. See also Schad, supra note 207, at 399 (arguing that adolescents in “structured cir-
cumstances,” such as those involved in end of life decisions, should be free to give their own 
informed consent). 
 228.  Steinberg et al., supra note 62, at 592; Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1109–10 (adoles-
cents engage in higher rates of risky behavior than do adults when in “emotionally charged” or 
“pressured situations” despite being as knowledgeable, logical, reality-based, and accurate when 
thinking about risky activity as their elders). It may often be difficult to determine whether a 
given case constitutes one of “unhurried logical reflection,” where adolescents could enjoy per-
sonhood rights, or one of “emotional arousal” influenced by peer pressure, where protectionism 
prevails. Consider, for example, a situation where a juvenile asserts a right to be emancipated 
from her parents over their objection. While “unhurried logical reflection” may be present, 
emancipating oneself from one’s parents may be deemed a heady matter for many teenagers, thus 
generating peer influence to seek emancipation. For a case where an eighteen-year-old filed for 
emancipation over the objection of her parents, see Ort v. Ort, 42 A.3d 1072 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 2012). See also, In re Snyder, 532 P.2d 278 (Wash. 1975) (sixteen-year-old petitioned court 
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3. Contextual protectionism 
Assuming the validity of the social science described above,229 it is 
fair to say that the scientific rationale of the punishment cases extends 
beyond culpability issues within the criminal or juvenile justice con-
texts, while not necessarily mandating protectionism throughout the 
whole of juvenile law.230 While it is not readily apparent how extensive 
the precedential value of the punishment cases will be, they seem 
clearly relevant in cases assessing constitutional rights of juveniles in 
contexts involving risky conduct.231 The punishment cases are arguably 
also applicable in situations involving decisions and actions by juveniles 
that are not risky in nature, but that might nevertheless be influenced 
by desires to gain peer approval or to avoid peer rejection.232 
To illustrate their potential impact on issues other than juvenile 
culpability, the next section relates the punishment cases to a hypo-
thetical situation of a juvenile asserting a claim of a constitutional right 
to engage in acts of sexual intimacy, in violation of state statute and 
against the wishes of her parents. Although the case is hypothetical, it 
is derived from fact situations of actual lower court cases. 
V. The Punishment Cases and State Prohibitions of 
Fornication between Juveniles 
The Supreme Court has rarely addressed constitutional controver-
sies where the interests of parents and the State align against a juvenile. 
 
to declare her an “incorrigible child,” over objection of her parents, in order to be removed from 
her parents’ custody). 
 229.  See supra text and notes 222–225. 
 230.  The Court has already referenced the punishment cases in a situation not dealing with 
culpability issues. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). It remains to be seen 
whether the Court will eventually recognize the studies equating adolescent and adult cognitive 
capabilities. See supra, notes 222–225 and accompanying text. Such recognition may suggest a 
wider recognition of personhood rights and a rethinking of some prior cases. See, e.g., discussion 
of the Parham case, supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 231.  Peer influence affects adolescent judgment through “direct” peer pressure, as when 
they are induced to take risks they might otherwise avoid, and also “indirectly” through the desire 
for peer approval, and consequent fear of rejection, even without direct coercion. ELIZABETH S. 
SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 38–39 (2008). 
 232.  Id. See, e.g., the emancipation example, supra note 228. 
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However, a possible candidate that could reach the Court in the near 
future concerns the unsettled question of whether fornication statutes 
can constitutionally be applied to adolescents who engage in private 
consensual sexual activities with other adolescent partners. This sec-
tion will analyze that issue, taking into account the impact of the 
Court’s recent punishment cases. The discussion will show that appli-
cation of those cases leads to a decisive finding of constitutionality, 
which would be uncertain without their precedent. 
A. Kathy’s Case: Framing the Issue 
Suppose a mother and father have a fifteen-year-old daughter, 
Kathy. The mother hears a noise in Kathy’s bedroom at 3:00 in the 
morning on a school day. The mother opens the bedroom door, enters 
the room to check on Kathy, and immediately notices that a bedroom 
window is open wide enough for a person to enter. Upon turning on 
the bedroom light, the mother discovers Kathy engaged in sexual in-
tercourse with a young man, Mike, also fifteen-years-old, whom Kathy 
had secretly invited into her room. The mother, who has taught Kathy 
the virtues of sexual abstinence prior to marriage, is shocked, surprised, 
and upset by her discovery.233 
Having experienced a long history of rebellion by Kathy against a 
variety of family rules, Kathy’s parents decide to elicit state assistance 
in governing their child. They request that Kathy be adjudicated a 
child in need of supervision.234 While juvenile authorities evaluate the 
request, Kathy and Mike both confess to engaging in sexual inter-





 233.  The facts in the text correspond roughly to those of In re J.M., 575 S.E. 2d 441 (Ga. 
2003), discussed in detail, infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 234.  Parents often seek state assistance in managing their disobedient children by request-
ing status offenses adjudications. See, e.g., In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S. 2d 940 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) 
(mother seeking PINS adjudication of her fifteen-year-old daughter for association with an older 
lesbian). See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process 
Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L. Q. 153, 172–73 (1978) (discussing status offense jurisdic-
tion as “the classic resort to public force in support of parental authority”). 
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 both Kathy and Mike with an act of delinquency for violating the state  
fornication statute.235 Kathy’s parents support the delinquency action, 
 
 235.  Fornication, in the context of penal law, is the crime of voluntary sexual intercourse 
between unmarried parties. A HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW TERMS 279 (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 
(2000)). While now constitutionally suspect, see infra notes 239–258 and accompanying text, for-
nication prohibitions still exist in roughly a quarter of the states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 
(West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6603 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §18 
(West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.335 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN §609.34 
(West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-29-1 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-184 (West 
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1120 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §16-15-60 (2012); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §76-7-104 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-344 (West 2012) (held unconstitu-
tional when applied to adults, see infra notes 251–258 and accompanying text). 
It should be noted that Kathy’s arguably immoral and possibly unhealthy sexual conduct could 
also have triggered a status offense petition under commonly-enacted language imposing juvenile 
court jurisdiction for such things as a juvenile behaving in a manner “injurious to [her] health or 
morals.” See, e.g., NEB. REV. STATS. § 43-247(3) (Reissue 1998) (extending juvenile court juris-
diction to juveniles who “deport [themselves] so as to injure or endanger seriously [their morals 
or health]”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Anderson Supp. 1995) (same) E.S.G. v. State, 
447 S.W. 2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (upholding the quoted language against a void-for-vague-
ness attack). See also, infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text for a discussion of the status 
offense/delinquency distinction. In my hypothetical, I chose to have Kathy’s case brought as a 
delinquency matter in order to raise the issue of the constitutionality of fornication statutes as 
applied to minors. 
In addition to being governed by a fornication statute or as a juvenile status offense measure, in 
some jurisdictions the sexual conduct of both Kathy and Mike could theoretically be punished 
under gender-neutral statutory rape laws. For example, an Arizona statute provides: “A person 
commits sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual inter-
course . . . with any person who is under eighteen years of age.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1405 (2012). The Supreme Court has suggested that such provisions “permit prosecution of both 
minor females and minor males [presumably for the same act of sexual intercourse] for engaging 
in mutual consensual conduct.” Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 493 (1981) (reject-
ing an equal protection challenge to a California statutory rape statute punishing only males). 
Similarly a Utah statute defines “rape of a child” as follows: “A person commits rape of a child 
when the person has sexual intercourse with a child who is under the age of 14.” UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-402.1(1) (2003). Thus where a thirteen-year-old girl had “consensual” sexual rela-
tions with a 12-year-old boy, under “the literal language of the statute . . . both [parties] could 
[be] adjudicated delinquent for rape of a child.” State ex rel. Z.C., 165 P.3d 1206, 1208 n.2 (Utah 
2007). Although the Utah Supreme Court declared that such an interpretation of the statute 
constituted an “absurd” result and was therefore not permitted, id. at 1211, the court proclaimed 
that the conduct of both parties could be punished under the state fornication statute. Id. at 1212. 
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believing that it may have beneficial consequences for their daugh-
ter.236 
At the adjudication proceeding, Kathy admits violating the forni-
cation statute, but argues that the statute unconstitutionally denies her 
right to engage in acts of sexual intimacy. The prosecution argues that 
the statute constitutionally protects legitimate state interests aimed at 
protecting the welfare of minors as well as providing a basis for enforc-
ing parental interests in inculcating the values of sexual abstinence in 
the lives of their children.237 
The following discussion will show that Kathy’s claim is strength-
ened considerably by the widely held view that adults now possess a 
constitutional right to engage in consensual sexual intimacies in pri-
vate.238 I will assess whether such a right extends to Kathy, first without 
taking the Supreme Court’s juvenile punishment cases into account. 
That analysis provides Kathy a strong argument that is subsequently 
discredited by my consideration of the impact of the punishment cases 





 236.  In most jurisdictions, delinquency adjudications are aimed at providing rehabilitative 
assistance to youthful violators of criminal statutes. See Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Jus-
tice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. 
REV. 1, 7–10 (2012). While the rehabilitative effectiveness of juvenile court dispositions has come 
under severe criticism, see generally, id., the Supreme Court has expressed a modicum of optimism 
that the juvenile court movement may eventually live up to its promise of benefitting those adju-
dicated delinquent. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (holding that jury trials 
are not constitutionally required in delinquency adjudications). The most common disposition 
for adjudicated delinquents is probation, with court-imposed conditions. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 
394–97. Commitment to an institution is possible but “is increasingly viewed as a last resort.” Id. 
at 394. 
 237.  A similar situation existed in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639–40 (1968), 
where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an obscenity statute directed only to minors as a consti-
tutionally permissible vehicle for aiding both state and parental responsibilities to promote the 
well-being of juveniles. 
 238.  See infra notes 239–248 and accompanying text. 
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B. Constitutionality of Fornication Statutes Applied to Adults 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the matter, it is 
widely assumed that fornication statutes are unconstitutional when ap-
plied to adults239 in light of a series of cases culminating in the Court’s 
2003 decision, Lawrence v. Texas.240 Without attempting a full account 
of these cases, I provide a brief summary of several which will suffice 
for present purposes. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut241 the Supreme Court recognized that 
sexual intimacies of married couples are protected by a right to privacy 
beyond the scope of government regulation.242 The right was given ex-
pansive articulation in the famous dictum of Eisentadt v. Baird: “If the 
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”243 Aspects of this right were extended 





 239.  Marghretta Adeline Haged, South Carolina’s Sexual Conduct Laws After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 61 S.C. L. REV. 799 (2010) (“State laws proscribing consensual sexual conduct between 
adults are unconstitutional. . . .”); Juhi Mehta, Prosecuting Teenage Parents Under Fornication Stat-
utes: A Constitutionally Suspect Legal Solution to the Social Problem of Teen Pregnancy, 5 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S T.J. 121, 142 (1998) (“[T]he . . . right to engage in sexual intercourse [is constitution-
ally] implicit.”); Val D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The State Marriage 
Amendments As Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 272 (2005) (“[F]ornication [is [n]ow] con-
stitutionally protected conduct.”). 
 240. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Even before Lawrence, some courts had struck 
down fornication statutes. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1977) 
(holding fornication statute violated “fundamental right to privacy”). 
 241. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a law forbidding the use 
of contraceptives unconstitutionally denied the right of marital privacy). 
 242.  See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 243.  Eisentadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (holding a Massachusetts statute crimi-
nalizing the dispensing of contraceptives to unmarried persons violated equal protection). Be-
cause Eisenstadt was decided on equal protection grounds, the statement quoted in the text ex-
pressing a substantive right to privacy is technically dicta. 
 244.  See supra notes 120–151 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, in Lawrence, a case described by Laurence Tribe as “laying 
down a landmark that opens vistas rather than enclosing them,”245 the 
Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy as 
violating constitutionally protected liberty applicable to “certain inti-
mate conduct.”246 The Court held that the state’s asserted interest in 
maintaining traditional moral standards constituted an insufficient ba-
sis to support the statute.247 Indeed, in concluding that the “Texas stat-
ute furthers no legitimate state interest” the Court apparently held that 
no possible justification could outweigh the privacy intrusion inherent 
in the statute.248 
While addressing homosexual sodomy, Lawrence is widely under-
stood as recognizing a broader reach that encompasses “a right for all 
people, both gay and straight, to engage in private intimate conduct 
free from government intrusion”249 Lawrence’s holding thus solidifies 
 
 245.  Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak 
its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). I have examined Lawrence in detail elsewhere. 
Martin R. Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 19 (2004). Thus, I will not repeat that discussion here. 
 246.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). The statute infringed on “a right to 
liberty under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 578. 
 247.  The Lawrence Court saw the central issue in the case as whether the “majority may 
use the power of the state to enforce [moral] views on the whole society through operation of the 
criminal law.” Id. at 571. The Court found that moral aversion to homosexual sodomy failed to 
constitute a “legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private 
life of the individual.” Id. at 578. 
 248.  Id. Thus, in the view of a court interpreting Lawrence, even an asserted interest in 
protecting public health would have been insufficient to sustain the Texas statute. See Martin v. 
Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005), discussed in detail, infra at note 251 and accompanying 
text. 
Some read Lawrence as applying minimal, “rational basis,” scrutiny, see, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 586 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Lawrence applies an “unheard-of form of rational basis review”). See 
infra notes 329–330 and accompanying text. Others find that the Court did not articulate a stand-
ard of review. See, e.g., Daniel Allender, Applying Lawrence: Teenagers and the Crime Against Na-
ture, 58 DUKE L. J. 1825, 1836 (2004) (the question of the standard of review “remains unre-
solved”); Tribe, supra note 245, at 1916, 1943 (the Lawrence Court did not articulate a standard 
of review). 
 249.  Allender, supra note 248, at 1839. “[T]he complete rationale for the decision supports 
a right of all unmarried adults to engage in whatever private, consensual sexual activity they will—
free of criminal sanction.” Ricks, supra note 239, at 279; “Lawrence . . . suggests a right . . . to an 
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the Eisenstadt dictum and extends constitutional privacy protection be-
yond decisions regarding procreative choices to any context involving 
private consensual intimate conduct. While broad in scope, the Law-
rence Court did attempt to place some limitation on the reach of the 
case, declaring that, among other things, “the present case does not 
involve minors.”250 Such language, while clearly dicta, is also ambigu-
ous. It is not clear whether it addresses cases where minors engage in 
consensual sexual intimacies with adults, or with other minors, or with 
both. 
Regarding its impact on fornication statutes, at least one court has 
concluded that Lawrence renders such statutes unconstitutional when 
applied to adults. In Martin v. Ziherl,251 the Virginia Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of the state fornication statute and 
found “no relevant distinction” between the sexual activity at issue in 
Lawrence and that prohibited by the Virginia statute.252 Finding heter-
osexual intercourse to constitute “an element of a personal relation-
ship . . . within the liberty interest of persons to choose,”253 the court 
concluded that subjecting that private conduct of two consenting 
adults to criminal penalties constituted a violation of liberty protected 
under the Due Process Clause.254 The Martin court read Lawrence255 as 
ruling out any attempt to justify the fornication statute in terms of such 
traditional state interests as protecting public health and assuring that 
children are not born out of wedlock.256 For the Martin court, these 
interests “are insufficient to sustain the statute’s constitutionality.”257 
Finally, the Martin court allowed that the fornication statute might be 
 
intimate sexual relationship distinct from marriage.” Tribe, supra note 245, at 1937. 
 250. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 251. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367 (Va. 2005). 
 252.  Id. at 370. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. at 370–71. The Utah Court of Appeals intimated that the State’s fornication statute 
may also be unconstitutional under Lawrence. Berg v. Utah, 100 P.3d 261, 263, n.3 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004). The Court did not address the merits of the constitutional claim because the person 
attacking the statute lacked standing to assert his claim. 
 255.  See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 256.  Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 370. 
 257.  Id. 
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constitutional when applied to juveniles, stressing that it is “important 
to note that this case does not involve minors” while observing that 
Lawrence leaves open the possibility of minors and adults possessing 
different privacy rights.258 
C. Constitutionality of Fornication Statutes Applied to Juveniles 
Assuming that fornication statutes are now unconstitutional when 
applied to adults, Kathy will claim that she is entitled to the same pro-
tection. As I will show, recognition of her claim may well depend on 
whether or not the protectionist principles of the punishment cases 
extend to her situation. 
1. Kathy’s claim without appeal to the punishment cases 
Apparently no cases yet address the impact of Lawrence on the con-
stitutionality of fornication statutes applied to juveniles. Even before 
Lawrence, however, some courts recognized that minors enjoy a state 
constitutional right to engage in sexual intimacies. For example, in B.B. 
v. Florida,259 a sixteen-year-old was charged in juvenile court with “un-
lawful carnal intercourse” with a consenting partner, also sixteen years 
old. The statute prohibited such conduct with anyone of previous 
“chaste character” under eighteen years old.260 The court found that 
enforcing the statute denied the minor’s state constitutional right to 
privacy, violation of which could not be justified in terms of state in-
terests in protecting the “health and quality of life” of those involved 
in “minor-minor” sexual activity.261 Noting that a minor’s privacy right 
could not be used to penetrate the “shield” of statutes protecting mi-
nors from sexual exploitation by adults,262 the court declared that en-
forcement of the minor-minor statute could not be used as a “weapon 
to adjudicate a minor delinquent,” even in light of “the real-life crisis 
of children having children,” the “plague of AIDS,” and “the rampant  
 
 
 258.  Id. at 371. 
 259.  B.B. v. Florida, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995). 
 260.  Id. at 257. 
 261.  Id. at 258–59. 
 262.  Id. at 259–60. 
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spread of serious communicative disease which is the sad product of 
sexual promiscuity.”263 
While B.B. is binding only in Florida, it does suggest a basis for 
recognition of a similar federal right to privacy for minors under exist-
ing case law, especially if Lawrence is applicable. Moreover, even with-
out Lawrence, Kathy has a plausible argument that application of the 
fornication statute violates her right to make “decisions whether to 
bear or beget a child” under Carey.264 
Whether Lawrence applies to minors is unclear. Although the Law-
rence Court noted that the case did not “involve minors,” the statement 
is clearly dicta and not binding on subsequent courts.265 Moreover, 
even if minors are exempted from Lawrence’s scope, it might only be in 
situations where young people risk being victimized by more powerful 
sexual partners, rather than in situations like Kathy and Mike’s where 
consensual sexual intimacies are shared by partners of roughly the 
same age with neither posing a particular risk of exploiting the other.266 
 
 263.  Id. The Georgia Supreme Court similarly found that a sixteen-year-old charged with 
the crime of fornication enjoyed a state constitutional right to privacy that protected his private, 
consensual, sexual intercourse with his sixteen-year-old girlfriend. In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 
2003). The court concluded that because sixteen was the age of consent for state statutory rape 
purposes, the minor was “sufficiently old to decide whether to engage in sexual intercourse” and 
therefore fell within the protection of the state constitutional privacy right, which outweighed 
the government’s asserted interest in “regulating the behavior of ‘minors.’” Id. at 444. The Geor-
gia Supreme Court had previously held that the state privacy provision prevented the state from 
criminalizing “private, unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy between persons legally 
able to consent,” thus exempting the parties in J.M. from criminal liability. Id. at 443. 
 264.  See supra text accompanying notes 124–126. 
 265.  At least one court has, however, interpreted Lawrence as inapplicable to statutes pun-
ishing minors for acts of sodomy. See In re R.L.C., 643 S.E. 2d 920 (N.C. 2007), upholding the 
delinquency adjudication of a fourteen-year-old who participated in acts of fellatio with his 
twelve-year-old girlfriend in violation of the state “crimes against nature” statute. The court 
found Lawrence inapplicable “by [its] very language,” quoting the dictum that “the present case 
does not involve minors.” Id. at 925 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
 266.  Some people argue, however, that “consensual” sexual relations between teenagers 
are inherently coercive, as girls often appear to “consent” while being influenced by a variety of 
factors, including a desire for male attention, thus entering into “painfully one-sided” bargains. 
Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 
BUFF. L. REV. 703, 709, 714 (2000). 
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Kathy will argue that the empirical data establishes that as an ado-
lescent she is a functional adult,267 entitled to the protections of Law-
rence268 that render fornication statutes unconstitutional.269 She will 
also rely on the principle articulated in Carey that minors enjoy the 
same privacy rights as adults unless “significant” state interests, unique 
to minors, justify denial of the rights.270 Kathy will point out that the 
health and risk of pregnancy issues found wanting by the Virginia court 
in Martin271 are exactly the same interests at stake in assessing the con-
stitutionality of fornication statutes when applied to juveniles, are not 
unique to minors, and therefore cannot override her privacy rights.272 
One aspect of Kathy’s case is uniquely different from the adult is-
sues addressed in Martin, however. The statute not only protects state 
interests, but assists her parents in their attempts to instill the values 
of chastity in her life.273 Kathy will respond by pointing out that even 
some pre-Lawrence courts have held that adolescents possess privacy 
rights that are beyond the power of parents to affect through invoking 
 
 267.  See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text . 
 268.  At least one serious commentator agrees. See Arnold H. Loewy, Statutory Rape in a 
Post- Lawrence v. Texas World, 58 S.M.U.L. REV. 77, 81, 88 (2005) “([I]f [a] State had absolutely 
precluded [a seventeen-year-old’s] sexual expression . . . it should be held unconstitutional”). 
 269.  See supra notes 239–258 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See supra text at note 123. “[I]f minors enjoy the same privacy rights as adults when 
making procreation decisions, the protections of Lawrence should also be extended to minors.” 
Claudio J. Pavia, Constitutional Protection of “Sexting” in the Wake of Lawrence: The Rights of Parents 
and Privacy, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 189, 208–209 (2011). See also Mehta, supra note 239, at 142 
(implicit in a minor’s right to decide matters involving childbearing is “the corresponding right 
to engage in sexual intercourse”). 
 271.  See supra notes 251–258 and accompanying text. 
 272.  Some commentators agree. See supra note 261. See also, Pavia, supra note 270, at 198: 
“Teens should be free from governmental control over private sexual activity when there is no 
exploitation or direct harm.” 
The claim in the text that there are no interests unique to juveniles assumes, of course, that the 
factors differentiating adolescents and adults recognized in the Supreme Court’s punishment 
cases are not taken into account. As will be shown in the next section, when those factors are 
considered, Kathy’s claim is refuted. 
 273.  See supra text at note 234. For a discussion of the possible futility and damage to par-
ent-child relations when parents report their child’s sexual activities to law enforcement author-
ities, see Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teenage Sex? 89 KY. L. 
J. 135, 192–95 (2000). 
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the power of the state. She will refer, for example, to a New York case 
holding that a mother’s attempt to have her fifteen-year-old daughter 
adjudicated a person in need of supervision because of the daughter’s 
refusal to stop associating with a twenty-one-year-old lesbian violated 
the daughter’s “right of privacy to decide and pursue her own sexual 
orientation.”274 
In addition to legal arguments, Kathy will raise a variety of policy 
considerations to support her claim. She will point out that her con-
duct with Mike would not be a crime in a substantial majority of 
states.275 Where statutes do prohibit the conduct, they are virtually 
never enforced,276 making their ability to deter the sexual activity vir-
tually non-existent. On the other hand, if prosecutions for fornication 
were regularly brought,277 the courts could be flooded given the high 
incidence of teenage sexual activity,278 with widespread jury nullifica-
tion arguably a possible result.279 Moreover, the threat of enforcement, 
even if remote, could discourage offenders from seeking access to con-
traceptives or medical care for sexually transmitted diseases through 
 
 274.  In re Lori, 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). The court did instruct the 
minor not to have sexual relations with the older woman, conduct which would offend state law 
prohibiting persons over the age of twenty-one from engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse with 
a person less than seventeen years of age.” Id. at 942. 
 275.  As of 2003, thirty-eight states had removed voluntary teenage sexual activity from the 
criminal law. Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Activity between 
Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 437 (2003). 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  The possibility of rigorous enforcement of fornication statutes is made difficult in 
light of the fact that evidence is seldom obtainable given the private, consensual nature of the 
conduct. 
 278.  As of 2005, studies indicated that nearly thirty percent of teens between the ages of 
thirteen and sixteen were sexually active. Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain’t So Sweet, Rethinking 
the Regulation of Adolescent Sexuality, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 271, 295–96 (2011) (citing Ana 
Maria Arumne, Nearly 3 in 10 Young Teens “Sexually Active,” MSNBC.COM (Jan. 31, 2005), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6839072). See infra text and notes 281–285. 
 279.  Phillis, supra note 278, at 296. Studies show that a majority of the American public 
has moved away from viewing voluntary sexual activity between teenagers as a crime. Phipps, 
supra note 275. If so, juries would likely be reluctant to convict minors in fornication cases. But 
see infra notes 310–320, 344–345 (fornication prosecutions will occur in juvenile court where 
juries are seldom utilized) and accompanying text. 
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fear of legal consequences.280 Finally, some argue that far from harm- 
ful, the conduct engaged in by Kathy and Mike is a healthy aspect of 
normal maturation.281 
2. Kathy’s claim and the punishment cases 
Whatever the credibility of Kathy’s claim to a personhood right to 
engage in private consensual intimate relations with Mike without gov-
ernment interference, the merits of her position virtually vanish when 
assessed in light of the categorical rule promulgated by the Supreme 
Court in the punishment cases. That the rule extends to cases outside 
the context of punishing juveniles has been urged earlier.282 
The punishment cases recognize that adolescents under age eight-
een are categorically less competent decision makers than adults283 due 
 
 280.  Phipps, supra note 275, at 438. One court expressed the concern this way: “To the 
extent that any successful program to combat venereal disease must depend upon affected persons 
coming forward for treatment, [fornication statutes] operate . . . as a deterrent to such voluntary 
participation. The fear of being prosecuted for the ‘crime’ of fornication can only deter people 
from seeking such necessary treatment.” State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 342 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1977). But see infra text and notes 347–348. 
 281.  “[S]ixty-three percent of the American public believes that adolescent sexual explora-
tion is a natural part of growing up”. Kuo, supra note 273, at 136. David Richards observes: 
If adolescents’ sexual conduct is governed by principles of equal concern and respect, 
there can be, I believe, no principled ethical objection to it. In contrast, the moralistic 
condemnation of all forms of sexual activity among adolescents encourages fears and 
misunderstandings of sexuality instead of facilitating sexual self-esteem and the sense 
of ethical discriminations that should rule all human relations. 
Richards, supra note 18, at 55. “[S]ubstantial numbers of doctors and other health professionals 
believe that [voluntary sexual intercourse] is a healthy part of an older adolescent’s development 
into adulthood.” Loewy, supra note 268, at 86. 
 282.  See supra notes 229–231 and accompanying text. 
 283.  Discussing the virtues of categorical age rules defining the point at which legal rights 
and responsibilities are triggered, Professor Elizabeth Scott has noted that “there is little evidence 
that . . . the interests of adolescents are harmed by a regime of binary classification.” Scott, supra 
note 224, at 577. Any argument that the law should expand the traditional binary distinction of 
child/adult reflected in the punishment cases by adding a third category of “adolescence,” with 
case-by-case assessments of maturity, would not be worth the administrative costs. Id. See also 
Buss, supra note 213, at 505 (bright line rules “are necessarily inexact, excluding young people 
prepared to behave competently and including some not ready to do so, but [the] lines make 
GARDNER (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2014 11:41 AM 
1] The Categorical Distinction between Adolescents and Adults 
53 
to: (1) youthful propensities to engage in risky behavior; (2) unique 
susceptibility of adolescents to peer pressure; and (3) transitory char-
acter development of juveniles manifesting itself in exceptional ame-
nability to rehabilitation.284 These factors become relevant “in emo-
tionally charged or pressured situations” where adolescents “tend to 
make bad decisions” and “struggle to control impulses that lead to un-
desirable behavior.”285 In such situations, the protectionist principles 
of the punishment cases should obtain. All three factors distinguishing 
adolescents from adults are clearly relevant when assessing the consti-
tutionality of fornication statutes applied to minors. 
 a. Fornication as risk taking. 
There is little question that unprotected sexual intercourse is risky 
behavior286 and that adolescents engage in such conduct in dispropor-
tionately large numbers.287 Sensation-seeking is a higher priority for 
adolescents than adults288 and is more prevalent during adolescence 
than in any other developmental period.289 A common manifestation 
of adolescent sensation seeking is sex without contraception,290 reflect-
 
things clear and simple, and keep the law out of the difficult and costly business of making indi-
vidualized assessments of capacity.”). 
A particular virtue of a categorical rule proscribing teenage sexual activity is that it provides a 
bright line giving an under-age adolescent who desires to avoid sexual activity an “easy answer to 
another adolescent who wants to engage in sexual activity.” Phipps, supra note 275, at 436. 
 284.  See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. 
 285.  Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1110. 
 286.  See infra notes 292–302 and accompanying text. 
 287.  See supra note 278 and accompanying text. By age seventeen, approximately two-
thirds of all adolescents have engaged in consensual sexual activity. Allender, supra note 248, at 
1828; Marghretta Adeline Hagood, Note, South Carolina’s Sexual Conduct Laws After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 61 S.C.L. REV. 799, 814 (2010) (estimated 90% of men and 80% of women have premar-
ital sex before age nineteen); Hamilton, supra note 214, at 1108 (adolescents more likely than 
adults to have casual sex). Professor Kuo has characterized this situation as an “epidemic of teen-
age sex.” Kuo, supra note 273, at 161. See also Phipps, supra note 275, at 436 (describing high 
incidence of teenage sexual activity). 
 288.  Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 61, at 1773. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Buss, supra note 213, at 495. 
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ing the relatively high value adolescents place on the immediate re-
wards of risky behavior while heavily discounting its future costs.291 
The risks entailed in teenage sexual activity are well known. The 
United States has an alarmingly high rate of teenage pregnancy,292 the 
most common outcome of which is single motherhood293 with all its 
associated problems.294 Also of considerable concern is the incidence 
of sexually transmitted disease (STD), described as an “epidemic” by 
the United States Center for Disease Control.295 Young people are dis-
proportionately represented, with half of the twenty million yearly in-
fections affecting people ages fifteen to twenty-four.296 Of teenagers 
having sex, one in four will contract an STD prior to adulthood297 
while one in two sexually active young people will be infected with an 
STD by the age of twenty-five.298 One of the long-term consequences 
of this epidemic is a high rate of infertility each year because of un-
treated STDs.299 Finally, mental health is also jeopardized by teenage 




 291.  Id. 
 292.  Mehta, supra note 239, at 123. 
 293.  Poncz, supra note 215, at 321. It is estimated that 40% of teenage pregnancies end in 
abortion. Teen STD Rates Rise, Despite High Condom Use, http://townhall.com/news/religion/ 
2012/07/05/teen_std_rates_rise_despite_high_condom_use (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 294.  “Studies [show] that women who become parents as teenagers are at greater risk of 
social and economic disadvantage than those who delay childbearing until adulthood.” Mehta, 
supra note 239, at 123. “They are . . . likely to have larger families, raise their children in poverty, 
rely on welfare, and are less likely to complete high school, to be married, to have employment 
prospects, and to earn high wages.” Id. See also Poncz, supra note 215, at 321–22. 
 295.  “Severe Epidemic” of Sexually-Transmitted Diseases is Sweeping the Nation, Warns CDC 
on Valentine’s Day, MAILONLINE.COM, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2278457/CDC-warns-Valentines-Day-eve-severe-epidemic-sexually-transmitted-diseases-
sweeping-nation.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  STD Statistics, TEENHELP.COM, http://www.teenhelp.com/teen-sexuality/std-statis-
tics.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 298.  STD Facts: Shocking Statistics You May Not Know about STDs, HUFFINGTONPOST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/std-facts_n_1282151.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2013). 
 299.  Teen STD Rates Rise, supra note 293. 
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dren, Congress has declared that “sexual activity outside of the context 
of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological effects.”300 
Experts attribute the high rate of reckless sexual activity in part to 
the characteristic tendency of adolescents to believe that they are im-
mune from long-term consequences of their actions.301 Such attitudes 
were, of course, a factor in the Supreme Court’s conclusion that ado-
lescents are categorically different from adults for purposes of impos-
ing punishment.302 
 b. Fornication and peer pressure. 
That teenage sexual activity is influenced by peer pressure also 
needs little discussion. One commentator summarized a study of the 
issue by concluding that “the driving force behind teen sexual activity 
is peer pressure,”303 both in the “direct” sense of being pressured into 
sexual activity by a sexual partner304 and “indirectly” by imitating sexual 
behavior thought to be normative of the teen peer group.305 One need 
only recall the “pregnancy pact” entered into by at least eighteen girls 
in a Massachusetts high school306 to understand the power of adoles-
cent peer pressure to influence sexual activity. 
 
 300.  42 U.S.C. § 710(2)(B),(E)(2012). See also Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates, 
10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 311, 317 (“[C]hildren succumbing to the pressure to have sex can 
lead to significant psychological damage”). 
 301.  Teen STD Rates Rise, supra note 293. 
 302.  See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 303.  Kuo, supra note 273 at 188. 
 304.  Cooper, supra note 300 at 317 n.41 (“[G]irls are pressured to be sexual regardless of 
the quality of relationships”), quoting MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES 
OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 207 (1995). See also Oberman, supra note 266; Michelle Oberman, Turn-
ing Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Laws, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
15, 68–70 (1994). 
 305.  See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 61 at 1773 (“[S]ocial status appears to be an 
important factor to many adolescents” contributing to risky decision-making regarding sexual 
activity); Kuo, supra note 273, at 188 (“[S]tudents who believed that most of their peers have had 
sex were 2.5 times more likely . . . to report a high intention to initiate [sexual intercourse] in the 
upcoming school year”) quoting B. Kinsman et al., Early Sexual Initiation: The Role of Peer Norms, 
102 PEDIATRICS 1185 (Nov. 1998). The distinction between “direct” and “indirect” peer pres-
sure is noted supra note 231. 
 306.  Discussed at Phillis, supra note 278, at 272–75. 
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As with the tendency to engage in risky behavior, the influence of 
peer pressure on adolescent sexual behavior is of the very kind dis-
cussed in the Supreme Court’s punishment cases.307 Indeed, it is likely 
that peer pressure is an even more powerful influence of sexual behav-
ior between teenage sexual partners—where the conduct is often legal 
and, for many, morally ambiguous—than it is in the context of criminal 
activity considered in the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases.308 
 c. Fornication and transitory character development. 
The protectionism manifested in the punishment cases is also in 
part a consequence of the Court’s conclusion that juveniles are 
uniquely amenable to rehabilitation due to their transitory character 
 
 307.  See supra text and notes 164–168. Cauffman and Steinberg observe: 
One might be tempted to conclude . . . that given their priorities, adolescent risk-
takers make perfectly reasonable decisions. But while such decisions may be cogni-
tively reasonable, they do not necessarily reflect maturity of judgment. 
Consider, for example, a hypothetical adolescent male who is deciding whether to en-
gage in unprotected sex. If he does, there are possible negative consequences (e.g., a 
sexually transmitted disease, his partner’s pregnancy) and possible positive conse-
quences (e.g., physical pleasure, excitement, improved status among peers, future re-
lationship with partner). From a purely cognitive point of view, if, in the adolescent’s 
mind, the possible positive consequences outweigh the possible negative conse-
quences, then he should say “yes.” But this is precisely where the difference between 
decision-making competence and maturity of judgment is crucial. If the adolescent is 
responsible, peer pressure will not be a major factor in his decision, by virtue of his 
autonomy. If the adolescent has perspective, he will recognize that the relationship 
does not hinge on this single decision. And if the adolescent is temperate, the im-
portance of “living for the moment” will be minimized. Thus, maturity of judgment 
reflects a particular disposition towards the weighting of possible outcomes in a deci-
sion-making scenario. 
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 61, at 1773–74. 
 308.  Because the criminal conduct involved in the punishment cases (serious felonies) is 
proscribed by regularly enforced statutes, universally supported by the moral sentiments of soci-
ety, fewer “peers” are likely to encourage colleagues to commit those crimes than to engage in 
sexual conduct. Moreover, while committing serious felonies may be deemed normative in some 
sub-cultures and thus subject to “indirect” peer pressure, see supra note 305 and accompanying 
text, the widespread incidence of teenage sexual activity is much more likely to be imitated by 
teens in general than is the commission of serious felonies. 
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development.309 This amenability contributed to the conclusion that 
criminal sentences for juveniles with no possibility of rehabilitation are 
unconstitutional. 
As with risk-taking and vulnerability to peer pressure, the rehabil-
itation factor is likewise directly relevant when assessing the constitu-
tionality of fornication statutes applied to juveniles. As Kathy’s case 
illustrates, enforcement of fornication statutes occur in juvenile 
court,310 where the customary aim of the preceding is to rehabilitate 
the offender.311 Indeed, if fornication statutes are unconstitutional for 
adults,312 a violation of such statutes by a minor would not, strictly 
speaking, constitute an act of “delinquency” but instead would techni-
cally manifest a “status offense,” and as such would almost certainly be 
limited to juvenile court jurisdiction.313 In addition to prosecution un-
der fornication statutes, the conduct proscribed therein may also be 
 
 309.  See supra note 178. 
 310.  See discussion of the B.B. case, supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text; In re 
L.A.N., 623 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding fornication statute as applied to juveniles 
under sixteen-years-old). Prior to the Lawrence case, there may have been in some jurisdictions a 
theoretical possibility of a juvenile fornication case being waived to criminal court. However, 
virtually all waiver criteria consider, among other things, the “seriousness of the offense,” that 
factor (along with prior history of the juvenile) weighed most heavily by judges making waiver 
decisions. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 334. Given the ubiquity of the conduct governed by fornication 
statutes and the acceptance of the conduct by much of the public, see supra note 281, it is hard to 
imagine a juvenile court judge ever waiving a fornication case to criminal court. 
After Lawrence, however, fornication statutes can be enforced only against juveniles, and then 
most likely in juvenile court. See infra notes 256–258 and accompanying text (discussing the im-
plications of the likely unconstitutionality of fornication statutes when applied to adults). If such 
statutes are unconstitutional, there could be no adult punishment for such conduct, thus elimi-
nating adult criminal court jurisdiction. 
 311.  See, e.g., In re N.A., 539 S.E.2d 899, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding adjudication 
of a twelve-year-old girl for committing “the delinquent act of fornication” who was therefore 
“in need of treatment and rehabilitation”). See also infra notes 316–322. 
 312.  See supra notes 239, 251–257 and accompanying text. 
 313.  “Delinquency” matters are those juvenile court proceedings where the conduct of the 
offender would be a crime if committed by an adult. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 359. “Status offenses” 
involve state intervention in situations unlawful only for minors. Id. at 93. 
“The juvenile court . . . has jurisdiction over so called “status offenses.” Id. at 258. At the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, progressive reformers created juvenile courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over noncriminal misconduct by youth. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile 
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seen as violating status offense provisions. As mentioned above, pros-
ecutors may choose to treat sexual activity by minors as a threat to their 
“health or morals”314 or under other such language characteristic of 
many status offense statutes.315 Adjudication as either a status offender 
or a delinquent usually results in structured probation aimed at reha-
bilitating the juvenile.316 While institutional confinement is a theoret-
ical possibility,317 it is increasingly viewed as a last resort,318 and in some 
jurisdictions cannot be imposed unless the court is convinced that all 
less drastic dispositional alternatives have been exhausted.319 Even if a 
court imposes an institutionalized commitment, its purpose is almost 
always rehabilitative, at least in part.320 
The Supreme Court’s recognition in the punishment cases that ju-
veniles are categorically different from adults, due in part to their 
unique amenability to rehabilitation, is the very premise of the juvenile 
court movement.321 If it is unconstitutional to deny juveniles rehabili-
tation through the imposition of death and mandatory life imprison-
ment, it is difficult to see how it could be unconstitutional to afford 
 
Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991); Leta R. Holden, Juvenile Law, 73 DENV. L. REV. 843, 845 
(1996) (juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over status offenses). Committing a status of-
fense “may subject the child to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” DONALD T. KRAMER, 2 LEGAL 
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 307 (Rev. 2d ed. 2005). The same is true of delinquency jurisdiction. 
“Generally . . . legislatures have conferred upon the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over 
children alleged to be delinquent.” SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 53 (2d. ed. 2013). 
 314.  See supra note 235. See also E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W. 2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), 
 for an example of likely sexual activity being addressed through status offense language proscrib-
ing conduct “injurious to [the defendant’s] health or morals.” 
 315.  For a case illustrating how conduct can be conceptualized either as a delinquency sit-
uation or a status offense matter, see In re Spalding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975) (drug and sexual 
activity of minor with adults initially considered acts of delinquency but ultimately treated as a 
status offense matter). 
 316.  See supra note 236. Probation conditions could include, among other things, educat-
ing the offender regarding the risks of sexual activity and the values of sexual abstinence. 
 317.  DAVIS, supra note 2, at 388. 
 318.  Id. at 394. 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  See Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice, supra note 103, at 6–25, discussing the emer-
gence of punishment as an additional goal to rehabilitation in some delinquency dispositions. 
 321.  See Id. at 6–12. 
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them the possible rehabilitative protections of the juvenile court when 
they engage in risky sexual conduct.322 
 d. Summary. 
It is clear that the same factors that distinguish adolescents from 
adults in administering punishment also distinguish them from adults 
when determining the constitutionality of governmental regulation of 
sexual conduct. This similarity could mean that the adolescent/adult 
distinction—which precludes juveniles from being held to adult re-
sponsibility for the punitive consequences of certain crimes—is itself 
sufficient to deny adult rights to engage in consensual, private acts of 
sexual intimacy. Juveniles would thus be denied personhood rights in 
both the punishment and fornication contexts,323 and instead granted 
the protectionism characteristic of the Court’s historical view of juve-
nile rights.324 Yet, there might still remain a question about whether 
the adolescent/adult distinction in and of itself provides an adequate 
basis for dismissing entirely the possible impact of the Lawrence case. I 
therefore turn to the specific question of whether the privacy rights of 




 322.  For many, the “rehabilitative protections of the juvenile court” are illusory. See, e.g., 
Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abol-
ishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083 (1991); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: 
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 
(1997). I take no position in this Article as to the effectiveness of the juvenile court system in 
rehabilitating adjudicated offenders. 
For a case upholding a fornication statute attacked by a juvenile as violating state constitutional 
privacy protections, see In re L.A.N. 623 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 323.  For the view that punishment is an aspect of a basic right to treated as a “person” see 
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 572 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman 
Gross eds. 1975); Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: Some Implica-
tions of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989); Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be 
Punished—A Suggested Constitutional Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 838 (1981). 
 324.  See supra notes 116–124 and accompanying text. 
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3. Kathy’s claim and Lawrence 
As noted above, the Lawrence Court declared in ambiguous dicta 
that “the present case does not involve minors.”325 While some have 
interpreted this statement to mean that the privacy protections spelled 
out in the case are simply inapplicable to minors in any possible con-
text,326 others read the case as not only relevant to constitutional pri-
vacy claims by minors but in fact extending to them the rights identi-
fied in the case.327 Assuming for the sake of argument, that Lawrence 
might be applicable to Kathy’s case, it then becomes necessary to de-
termine whether the punishment cases provide a basis for distinguish-
ing Lawrence when assessing the constitutionality of fornication stat-
utes applied to minors. 
The Lawrence Court invalidated the Texas sodomy statute because 
no legitimate state interest supported the statute.328 Thus, the statute 
was unconstitutional under even minimal, “rational basis,” review.329 
Assuming that Kathy’s attack of the fornication statute under Lawrence 
would also be subject to rational basis review,330 the statute would be 
 
 325.  See, e.g., supra note 242 and accompanying text. “Lawrence’s application to consensual 
teen sexual activity is not . . . certain.” Pavia, supra note 270 at 201. 
 326. See, e.g. supra note 265 discussing the R.L.C. case. Some commentators agree. See, e.g., 
Ricks, supra note 239 (Lawrence “covers only the conduct of adults”). 
 327.  See, e.g., supra note 260. 
 328.  See supra notes 247–248 and accompanying text. 
 329.  See supra note 248 and accompanying text. The Cornell University Law School Legal 
Information Institute defines “rational basis review” as follows: 
The level of judicial review for determining the constitutionality of a federal or state 
statute that does not implicate either a fundamental right or a suspect classification 
under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 
When a court concludes that there is no fundamental liberty interest or suspect clas-
sification at stake, the law is presumed to be Constitutional unless it fails the rational 
basis test. Under the rational basis test, the courts will uphold a law if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose. The challenger of the constitutionality of 
the statute has the burden of proving that there is no conceivable legitimate purpose 
or that the law is not rationally related to it. 
Rational Basis Test, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test 
(last updated Aug. 19, 2010). 
 330.  The Martin court, see supra notes 251–252 and accompanying text, applied the “rea-
soning of Lawrence” in finding no legitimate state interest to support the fornication statute struck 
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constitutional unless Kathy could show that the statute did not “rea-
sonably” promote some “legitimate” state interest.331 
The adolescent/adult distinction established by the Court in the 
punishment cases means that legitimate governmental interests may 
well be different for juveniles than for adults. Indeed, while interests 
in preventing out of wedlock pregnancy and STDs may not constitute 
legitimate state interests when fornication statutes are applied to 
adults,332 those interests become legitimate when the same statutes are 
enforced against minors, given teenage propensities for rampant un-
protected sex encouraged by widespread peer influence. Sexual activity 
by minors thus poses a special danger, unique to them, to which the 
state may legally respond.333 The question then becomes whether for-
nication statues reasonably promote these legitimate state interests. 
Kathy’s points about the minimal enforceability of fornication statutes 
 
down under rational basis scrutiny. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367, 370–71 (Va. 2005). See also 
Justice Scalia’s view, supra note 248 (the Lawrence Court applied an “unheard of” form of rational 
basis review). 
 331.  See supra note 329. 
 332.  See Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 370 (finding that Lawrence finds any and “all manner of 
states’ interests . . . insufficient” to justify intrusions upon a person’s “private, consensual sexual 
conduct”). 
 333.  The state has historically invoked its parens patriae power to intervene in the lives of 
minors in efforts to protect their welfare. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 95,n. 14. Indeed, the parens 
patriae concept constituted the historical justification for the juvenile court movement, which saw 
young people as lacking adult culpability while being uniquely capable of being rehabilitated. 
DAVIS, supra note 313, at 1–3. As to the “legitimacy” of regulating sexual activity of minors, a 
Wisconsin court made these comments in an unpublished post-Lawrence opinion: “This state has 
a long tradition of honoring its obligation to protect its children from themselves. Among the 
many significant interests of the state are the dangers of pregnancy, venereal disease, damage to 
reproductive organs, the lack of considered consent, heightened vulnerability to physical and 
psychological harm, and the lack of mature judgment.” State v. Pryes, 320 Wis.2d 705, 2009 WL 
1606746, 2 (Wis.Ct. App.) (emphasis added). 
The recognition of “significant” interests in regulating teenage sexual activity should satisfy even 
the Carey plurality’s caution that only a “significant state interest,” unique to minors, would justify 
state denials of the “privacy rights of minors.” Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 
693 (1977). It must be remembered that only a plurality of the Court in Carey recognized a pri-
vacy right applicable to juveniles. Id. Moreover, the Court assumed that the “Constitution does 
not bar state regulation of the sexual behavior of minors,” id. at 694, n. 17, thus calling into 
question the applicability of the Lawrence privacy right to juveniles. 
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and their potential to discourage acquiring contraceptives and medical 
care for STDs334 pose questions about the rationality of such statutes. 
It must be remembered, however, that under rational basis scrutiny the 
statute need not be “narrowly tailored” to meet the state’s interest nor 
be the “least restrictive alternative available.”335 The statute need only 
“arguably” protect those interests in a manner that is not totally arbi-
trary.336 
It is unlikely that fornication statutes will ever be rigorously en-
forced. Obtaining evidence sufficient for conviction is notoriously dif-
ficult337 and even when available, prosecutors often decline to bring 
charges.338 As a consequence, the deterrent effect of the statutes is min-
 
 334.  See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text. 
 335.  Such factors are requirements under the “strict scrutiny” standard. See NOLO’S FREE 
DICTIONARY OF LAW TERMS AND LEGAL DEFINITIONS STRICT SCRUTINY, available at 
http://www.nolo.com/dictionarystrict_scrutiny_term.html. 
 336.  The Supreme Court put the matter this way: 
On rational-basis review, a . . . statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong presumption 
of validity . . . and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have 
the burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” . . . Moreover, 
because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it 
is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the 
challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. . . . In other words a legisla-
tive choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational spec-
ulation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. 
FCC v. Bearch Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (citations omitted). The Court has 
specifically recognized that so long as “plausible rationales” that merely “arguably” promote gov-
ernmental interests exist, they are “sufficient on rational-basis review to immunize the [statute] 
from constitutional challenge.” Id. at 320. Not surprisingly, commentators have concluded that 
under such a relaxed standard “virtually any [statute] can survive rational basis review.” Robert 
C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 
281, 294 (2011) (noting that in rare instances, the Court has employed a more demanding rational 
basis standard). 
 337.  See, e.g., Phipps, supra note 275 at 438; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, note on adul-
tery and fornication, at 435 (1980) (“Discovery and proof of [fornication] by means other than 
self-admission is virtually impossible and is likely to involve surveillance techniques that are un-
seemly, if not unconstitutional.”). 
 338.  Prosecutors presently make “difficult decisions” about culpability when deciding 
whether to bring charges against minors engaging in sexual activity. Phipps, supra note 275, at 
436. 
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imized, but so also is the risk of dissuading minors from accessing con-
traceptives and medical care. 
More rigorous enforcement of fornication laws is possible. For ex-
ample, evidence of the crime is readily available when pregnancy oc-
curs.339 If both prospective parents are charged, equal protection prob-
lems are minimized.340 Widespread enforcement would arguably 
increase the deterrent effect of the statutes.341 Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, rigorous enforcement would send a clear message to young 
people that sexual activity is not condoned by society, perhaps provid-
ing an objective basis for those attempting abstinence to resist peer 
pressure to engage in the conduct.342 
Rigorous enforcement of fornication statutes against juveniles 
would entail some costs. Flooding the courts with litigation may in-
deed result343 but the perceived problem of wholesale jury nullifica-
tion344 is a red herring given that juries are seldom utilized in juvenile 
 
 339.  See Mehta, supra note 2391 at note 121–26 (discussing fornication charges brought in 
Idaho against pregnant teenagers and their boyfriends). Although such a practice is arguably le-
gal, but see Mehta, supra note 239, at 130–151, it is certainly of questionable wisdom for, among 
other reasons, the incentive it creates for pregnant minors to terminate their pregnancies rather 
than risk evidence of their pregnancy providing the basis for a fornication charge. See Traci 
Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Pro-
hibiting Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 795 n. 211 (1998). 
 340.  But see Mehta, supra note 239, at 130–34. 
 341.  Phipps, supra note 275, at 435. While the punishment cases found that adolescents 
are less deterrable than adults, there is no reason to believe that strict enforcement of fornication 
would have no deterrent effect on any teenager even in light of the tendencies of adolescents to 
seek instant gratification and be subject to peer influence. After reviewing the empirical data on 
the subject, Christopher Slobogin summarized the situation as follows: “All [the] evidence sup-
ports the proposition that children are less deterrable than adults.” Slobogin, supra note 41, at 
200. 
 342.  Phipps, supra note 275. Justice Breyer expressed a similar idea in suggesting that man-
datory drug tests of high school students who engage in extracurricular activities provides a basis 
for students to resist peer pressure to take drugs. The drug testing program “offers the adolescent 
a nonthreatening reason to decline his friend’s drug-use invitations, namely, that he intends to . . . 
engage in [one of many] interesting and important [school] activities.” Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 840–41 (2002) (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 343.  See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
 344.  See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
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courts.345 Probably the biggest problem with aggressive enforcement 
is the possibility of discouraging potential defendants from obtaining 
contraception or seeking medical treatment for STDs or pregnancy.346 
This risk may be exaggerated, however, because statutes in most states 
permit adolescents privately to consent to treatment for STDs, to re-
ceive contraceptive drugs and devices, and, in some jurisdictions, to 
consent to medical treatment for pregnancy—all without the 
knowledge of their parents or anyone else. 347 If fornication statutes 
were rigorously enforced, these statutory privacy protections would 
likely become widely known to juveniles,348 thus minimizing the disin-
centive to seek medical care for fear of possible fornication charges. 
 
 
 345.  A significant majority of jurisdictions forbid juries in juvenile court proceedings. 
DAVIS, supra note 313 at 298–99. Even where juries are permitted, they are in fact seldom utilized. 
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Reform, 79 MINN. L. 
REV. 965, 1107 (1995). 
 346.  See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 347.  Hartman, supra note 12, at 1309–10 (treatment for STDs); DAVIS, supra note 2, at 89 
(access to contraceptive drugs and devices (federal rule requiring parental notice of such struck 
down by the courts) and consent for pregnancy care). Over-the-counter forms of contraception 
are legally available to teens of any age, and pharmacies do not need to contact parents. Poncz, 
supra note 215, at 293. In many states, a youth does not need parental approval for prescription 
contraception. Id. at 293–94. See also Scott, supra note 224, at 567–68 (minors in many states given 
statutory rights to consent to treatment for STDs, birth control, and pregnancy). 
With a statutory right to consent to treatment, medical providers are obligated to keep confiden-
tial their treatment of teenage patients except in cases of child abuse. Adolescents, Protecting: En-
suring Access to Care and Reporting Sexual Activity and Abuse (Position Paper), AMERICAN ACADEMY 
OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, http://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/adolescent-protecting.html 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 348.  As the risk of prosecution would likely become known by word of mouth communi-
cations among adolescents, so would word spread from those understanding the minimal risk of 
evidence discovery from medical professionals to those assuming the existence a high risk of self-
incrimination through obtaining medical care. Indeed, competence in making medical care deci-
sions is the classic example of adolescent/adult cognitive equivalence. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 
224, at 566–67 (“[D]evelopmental psychology evidence indicates that older minors are mature 
enough in their cognitive development to make competent medical decisions.”). See also Schad, 
supra note 207, at 398–99 (“informed consent” situations are “structured” and prevent “impulsive 
action” by adolescents). Moreover, the state could itself inform the juvenile population that seek-
ing medical care would have no bearing on potential fornication charges. 
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At the same time, there is little reason to believe that rigorous en-
forcement of fornication statutes would significantly deter teenage sex-
ual activity. Fornication is the ultimate “crime of passion,” making it 
highly unlikely that many adolescents, already prone by nature to act 
impulsively, would be deterred by the threat of prosecution,349 espe-
cially when it is understood that proceedings would be brought under 
the rehabilitative umbrella of the juvenile court.350 
 
 349.  Leading commentators question whether criminal statutes ever deter their proscribed 
conduct. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darly, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L. J. 949, 951 (2003). Noting that 
deterrent predictions are “enormously difficult,” these authors point out that three prerequisites 
must exist is deterrence is to occur: (1) the potential offender must know the rule; (2) he must 
perceive the cost of violation as greater than the perceived benefit; and (3) he must be able and 
willing to bring such knowledge to bear on his conduct decision at the time of the offense. Id. at 
952–53. Moreover, “personality types” inclined toward “impulsiveness and toward discounting 
consequences” interfere with “rational calculation of self-interest by potential offenders,” thus 
inhibiting deterrence. Id. at 955. Obviously, the characteristics of adolescence detailed by the 
Supreme Court in the punishment cases, see supra note 269 and accompanying text, reflect “a 
personality type” unlikely to be deterred, especially from a crime like fornication, where the pas-
sion of the moment is likely to override “rational calculation.” 
 350.  The fact that fornication cases will be brought in juvenile court, see supra notes 310-
20 and accompanying text, might further minimize the deterrent effect of such prosecutions in 
light of the fact that rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is generally the dispositional goal. 
Even so, rehabilitative sanctions sometimes may be sufficiently unpleasant to create some deter-
rent effect. See Johannes Andenase, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. 
REV. 949, 971 (1966). Furthermore, punitive sanctions—with their inherent impositions of un-
pleasantness upon offenders aimed in part at least to deter—are increasingly employed within 
juvenile justice systems. See Gardner, supra note 103, at 6–22 (discussing the distinction between 
coercive rehabilitation and punishment). 
Even though minimal deterrence will likely be the result of sporadic enforcement of fornication 
statutes, the situation is still defensible. In fact, one commentator argues: 
The state’s most effective strategy for deterring consensual forms of disreputable con-
duct is likely to consist of criminalizing this conduct and enforcing the criminal ban 
sporadically. Excluding the practically unfeasible option of super-strong sanctions, all 
alternative strategies (which include (1) enforcing the law strictly or (2) not enacting 
any law at all) are likely to deter fewer violators. If this is true, then, contrary to the 
implication of standard political-economic accounts, states rationally would select a 
lax enforcement strategy even if enforcement resources were abundant and public 
opinion was almost uniform. 
Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 440 
(2002). 
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Appreciable deterrence is not necessary to satisfy rational basis 
scrutiny, however. There is no reason to believe that enforcement of 
fornication statutes would have no deterrent effect at all.351 Any deter-
rence is enough. If policy makers decide that minimal deterrence is 
worth the costs involved in rigorous enforcement of fornication stat-
utes, that is a choice for them, and not the courts, to make. 
But even if it could be shown that no deterrent effect is achieved 
through enforcing fornication statutes, such enforcement should still 
be deemed reasonable when it is remembered that juvenile courts have 
jurisdiction over the matter. It is not unreasonable to believe that some 
juvenile offenders might be helped after the fact of adjudication. For 
example, sex education programs, backed by the power of the juvenile 
court, could induce future abstinence in some offenders, or channel 
others away from “unsafe” sexual practices. That such benefits might 
occur only rarely does not negate the fact that they reasonably promote 
the state interests bottoming fornication statutes. 
Rather than rigorous enforcement, a more likely possibility in ju-
risdictions with fornication statutes is that they will rarely or never be 
enforced. If so, their existence may counterproductively engender pub-
lic disrespect for the law and encourage abuses of discretion by law 
enforcement officials.352 These downsides are outweighed, however, 
by several benefits that may flow from seldom enforced fornication 
statutes. 
The underlying purposes of fornication statutes may still be 
achieved, albeit rarely, with sporadic enforcement. Some deterrence of 
sexual activity may occur, especially in situations where the mere ex-
istence of the statute is appealed to as an objective basis for teens at-
tempting abstinence to resist peer pressure to engage in sexual con-
duct.353 Furthermore, the possible benefits of juvenile court 
dispositions would be available to the few adjudicated violators of the 
statutes. 
 
 351.  See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 352.  See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 337, at 435–36. Unenforced laws, particularly 
ones like fornication which proscribe conduct widely engaged in by the public, risk delegating 
power to the police to decide for themselves who shall be subject to penal sanctions and why. Id. 
at 335. 
 353.  See supra note 342. 
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That enforcement of fornication statutes occurs in juvenile court 
mitigates the problem of potential abuses of law enforcement discre-
tion often associated with seldom enforced statutes.354 As Kathy’s case 
illustrates, parents may seek state assistance in discouraging sexual ac-
tivity by their children through delinquency or status offense interven-
tions.355 Where law enforcement is initiated by parents, the concerns 
of police abuse of discretion and excessive governmental snooping in 
gathering evidence are substantially minimized, if not eliminated alto-
gether. 
Furthermore, the presence of fornication statutes provides parents 
state assistance in their attempts to instill in their children values of 
sexual abstinence or “safe” sex.356 While resort to juvenile court inter-
vention may not always yield clear benefits, and may sometimes dam-
age parent/child relationships,357 allowing parents this alternative is a 
reasonable state vehicle to grapple with the problem of rampant teen-
age sexual activity. Such an alternative addresses the concern that “the 
sexual revolution . . . seem[s] to have made children equal partners . . . 
with their parents . . . creat[ing] the false illusion that children have the 
capacity for unrestricted adult experience.”358 Empowering parents 
with the resources of juvenile court interventions for violations of for-
nication statutes reaffirms the parent as a “superior partner” vis-à-vis 
her child, and renders moot the claim by some personhood advocates 
that adolescents are “capable of choosing their own morality as long as 
they do not commit [a violation of the law.]”359 
 
 354.  See infra note 352 and accompanying text. 
 355.  See supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text. 
 356.  One commentator observed that “lawmakers should recognize the indispensable role” 
that parents play in “preventing their children from engaging in premature sexual experimenta-
tion.” Siji A. Moore, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legislature’s Attempt to Regulate 
Teen Sex through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOW. L. J. 197, 231 (2008). In arguing that the 
state should “empower” parents to better protect their children, the commentator claimed that 
“[i]t is undisputable that a statute [sanctioning] teenagers . . . for sexual experimentation gives 
parents who find out that their child is sexually active a powerful tool to terminate the activity 
and deter it from happening in the future.” Id. 
 357.  See supra note 273. 
 358.  Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1991). 
 359.  Gerald Grant, The Character of Education and the Education of Character, 110 
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Even as never enforced dead letter law, fornication statutes may 
still serve appropriate purposes. One commentator has even argued 
that “[n]on-enforcement of fornication statutes may be desirable” in 
view of the possible negative impact of enforcement on obtaining 
health care discussed above.360 Non-enforced statutes can serve the ed-
ucative function of signaling inappropriate behavior through announc-
ing prevailing, or inducing new, social norms.361 Moreover, if existing 
fornication statutes are repealed, the message—technically that sexual 
activity between minors is “permitted” and not “protected”362—might 
be interpreted by young people to be that the state and society approve 
of the conduct previously proscribed by the statute.363 Finally, total 
non-enforcement of fornication statutes would not be without some 
deterrent effect. As mentioned above, the mere existence of fornication 
statutes could provide a basis for some teens to resist peer pressure to 
engage in sexual activity.364 
The above discussion establishes that legitimate state interests are 
reasonably furthered through proscribing teenage sexual activity 
through the instrumentality of fornication statutes, whether rigor-
ously, seldom, or never enforced.365 Whatever the wisdom of enacting 
such statutes, they are clearly constitutional. 
 
DAEDALUS 135, 146 (1981) (noting the “crisis of authority in the American school”). Bruce 
Hafen has noted that “[d]enying a portion of parental authority necessarily adds to the authority 
of children.” Hafen, Children’s Liberation, supra note 5, at 654. The opposite is also true: Denying 
a portion of authority to children necessarily adds to parental authority. 
 360.  Stratton, supra note 339, at 795. 
 361.  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2032, 2035 
(1996) (arguing that “coercion might be defended as a way of increasing social sanctions” on such 
risk-taking activity as unsafe sex, with the possible result of producing a “new norm[ ] or new 
understanding of existing information.”). 
 362.  Hafen, Constitutional Status, supra note 4 at 567. 
 363.  Stratton, supra note 339, at 796. 
 364.  See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
 365.  At least one post-Lawrence court has recognized the legitimacy of protecting minors 
from the dangers of STDs through statutes prohibiting sexual contact. See In re R.L.C., 643 
S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 2007) (upholding sodomy statute when applied to minors). See also In re L.A.N., 
623 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that fornication statutes applied to minors are con-
stitutional). Allender, supra note 248, at 1854. 
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D. Summary 
While fornication statutes are almost certainly unconstitutional 
when applied to adults under the Supreme Court’s Lawrence decision, 
the Court’s juvenile punishment cases require differentiating between 
adults and adolescents when assessing rights to engage in private, con-
sensual sexual intimacies. The adult personhood rights recognized in 
Lawrence do not apply to the categorically distinct class of adolescents. 
The very characteristics that protect adolescents from harsh adult pun-
ishments also justify state protection of young people from the hazards 
associated with non-marital sexual activity. 
VI. Conclusion 
With very few exceptions, the Supreme Court has consistently 
voiced a protectionist posture when considering constitutional issues 
involving young people. The Court has traditionally reached its deci-
sions relying on common sense conclusions regarding the differences 
between children—including adolescents—and adults, without attend-
ing to relevant social science data that would arguably have informed 
the issues at hand. In particular, the Court has disregarded research 
suggesting that adolescents and adults possess comparable capacities to 
reason logically when making decisions about moral, social, and inter-
personal matters. Prior to the Court’s punishment cases, critics had 
argued that acknowledgment of this research should cause the Court 
to shift from its protectionist posture to a broader, if not total, recog-
nition of personhood rights for adolescents. 
However, rather than a broader embrace of adolescent person-
hood, the Court has recently decidedly reinforced its protectionist 
view by directly appealing, for the first time, to psychological research 
that shows not the similarities but rather the differences between the 
mental functioning of adolescents and adults. Relying on the data, the 
Court found that adolescents are categorically less culpable than adults 
and must thus be protected under the Eighth Amendment from the 
harshest penalties imposed on adult criminal offenders. The Court 
specifically found that when compared to adults, young people under 
age eighteen manifest unique propensities to engage in reckless behav-
ior and to be influenced by negative peer pressure. Also different from 
adults, adolescents exhibit underdeveloped and transitory character 
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development. Such conclusions imply—assuming a continued disre-
gard of the social science supporting recognition of personhood 
rights—that perhaps the Court has finally laid the empirical founda-
tions for a systematic protectionist theory of rights throughout the 
whole of juvenile law. 
I have argued that, whether or not the punishment cases portend 
ubiquitous protectionism, the cases do provide important precedential 
value in contexts outside Eighth Amendment excessive punishment is-
sues. Specifically, I have shown that the Court’s adolescent/adult dis-
tinction resolves the otherwise controversial issue of the constitution-
ality of governmental prohibitions of fornication between teenagers. 
In demonstrating the constitutionality of such prohibitions, I high-
lighted ways in which fornication statutes promote legitimate govern-
mental and parental interests, thereby refuting claims that adolescents 
possess constitutionally protected personhood rights to engage in pri-
vate, consensual sexual relations. 
Such a conclusion may not be of great practical moment, but it is, 
at least, a symbolically significant advancement in the on-going task of 
defining the scope of constitutional rights of young people. As shown 
by this paper’s discussion of teenage sexual activity, the future direc-
tion of that task may be dramatically shaped by the Supreme Court’s 
empirically grounded recognition of the uniqueness of adolescence 
spelled out in the juvenile punishment cases.  
